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Mobility forces are the air, sea and ground systems that transport military 
personnel and material throughout the world.  They include airlift and sealift, as well as 
road and rail systems.  Airlift provides a rapid and flexible means of deploying and 
sustaining forces, as well as fuel and supplies.  In many instances, deploying forces are 
able to draw on equipment and material prepositioned at sea or on land near the location 
of a crisis, so prepositioning is also considered a mobility program.  Aerial-refueling 
forces contribute to mobility by permitting the nonstop deployment of tactical air and 
bomber forces and by extending the range of airlift aircraft when en route bases are not 
available.  In operations ranging from humanitarian relief to combat, mobility forces 
enable the United States to deploy forces quickly and sustain them until their mission is 
complete.  The draw down of U.S. troop strength overseas and the increasing number of 
unstable situations abroad combine to place a high value on mobility forces. 
Mobility forces would be the key to the deployment and sustainment of U.S. 
forces in any major regional conflict (MRC).  Should conflict erupt with little warning, 
the United States would want to respond promptly with sufficient strength to help forces 
halt aggression and restore peace.  Airlift, augmented by prepositioning, would carry out 
the initial deployments.  These first flights would deliver primarily aviation and light 
ground forces, plus some heavier ground elements.  The remaining heavy combat forces 
would deploy by sea. 
Military interventions and peace operations still place heavy demands on mobility 
forces.  As in larger contingencies, mobility forces contribute both to the deployment and 
sustainment of forces.  Depending on the location, significant amounts of material must 
be moved, particularly if troops are sent where the infrastructure is limited and host 
nation support is either lacking or not available. 
The 1992 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) established mobility requirements 
for the post-Cold War era.  It defined the baseline requirements for intertheater (or 
 2
strategic) mobility and proposed a long-range investment plan to meet them.  
Specifically, the study validated the need of 120 C-17 aircraft and called for the 
acquisition of additional medium-speed sealift vessels and afloat prepositioning ships. 
A follow-on study, conducted in 1994, updated the original MRS findings to 
reflect changes in force structure and warfighting strategy resulting from the 1993 
Bottom-Up Review or MRS BURU.  The 1994 analysis affirmed the need for increases 
in key mobility components.  The MRS BURU examined intertheater airlift requirements 
in detail.  Based on the findings, DoD has established an intertheater airlift objective of 
between 49 to 52 million ton-miles per day of cargo capacity.  The precise amount of 
airlift needed will depend on the level of prepositioning that can be achieved overseas.  
As a result of DoD continuing to evaluate prepositioning options, the airlift objective will 
continually change. 
Airlift investments in the future have focused on replacing aging fleet intertheater 
aircraft.  A decision that has been reached by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
shows that at least a 120-aircraft C-17 force would be needed to meet strategic and 
tactical mission requirements at an acceptable level of risk.  Studies have shown that the 
120-aircraft C-17 force will provide the greatest amount of flexibility in meeting airlift 
requirements, at a cost only slightly higher than the other alternatives that met the 
requirements. 
The C-17 is the appropriate alternative to meet America’s future airlift 
requirements.  We must ensure the numbers are able to meet our needs.  The C-17 
completed the most rigorous evaluation of reliability, maintainability and availability 
ever conducted on a military airlift aircraft and its performance far exceeded 
expectations.  
B. PURPOSE 
This purpose of this thesis is to analyze the ability of our current and future airlift 
fleet to project and sustain U.S. power abroad as changes are identified in the Army’s 
Transformation process.  The current plan to procure only 134 C-17 Globemaster III 
aircraft to replace the C-141 fleet will not meet U.S. wartime requirements for core 
strategic airlift.  Although the C-17 is now exceeding design expectations, the fleet will 
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not provide enough volume core airlifts for the United States in the 21st Century.  
Fortunately the C-17’s ability to meet strategic airlift specifications, once arguable, is no 
longer a question. 
The Army will support Phase I of the Army Transformation as it stands up two 
Initial Brigade Combat Teams.  These brigades will have the capability of being deployed 
anywhere in the world in 96 hours from first aircraft wheels up.  Units are being formed 
with off-the-shelf capabilities and lessons learned from operational experience and the 
Army’s Experimentation Campaign Plan. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
• Can the current air mobility fleet meet our present national security?  
Objectives? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• Will the current air mobility force structure continue to be appropriate in 
the face of evolving strategy?  
• What will be the impact of strategic airlift on the Army Transformation 
Process? 
• How have changing missions affected air mobility requirements? 
• What are the limitations to our airlift requirements today as the Army’s 
Transformation campaign takes affect? 
D. SCOPE  
This research will examine the fundamental areas of airlift planning and 
operations.  The initial focus will explore the airlift requirements for both current and 
future airlift fleets.  Next, in order to meet these requirements, the report shifts toward the 
airlift fleet capabilities with the C-17 as the primary core airlifter.  Then a review of 
wartime and peacetime operations reveals how lift capability is degraded over the life of 
airlift systems.  Finally, this research examines how the Army’s transformation impacts 
the air mobility requirements.  This paper will conclude with recommendations for 
developing a realistic core airlift fleet. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
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I will use current published documentation and literature to provide the basis for 
answering the research questions in paragraph C.  In addition, I will conduct personal 
interviews with subject matter experts to further clarify and expand on information 
extracted from published documentation and literature.   
I will conduct literature search of pertinent transportation and logistic books and 
magazine articles, Department of Defense and Navy Publications, CD-ROM systems, and 
other library information to obtain information relevant to the capabilities and limitations 
of the existing air mobility requirements and specific requirements in identifying the 
Army Transformation requirements. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Following the introduction to the 
research area in Chapter I, Chapter II highlights the underestimation of airlift needed to 
deploy and sustain U.S. forces in major regional conflicts around the world.  Chapter III 
examines airlift to the extent to which current and future assets meet projected 
requirements.  Chapter IV examines the Army’s intent to quickly field brigades that are 
strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and 















II. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT TODAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, many military analysts believe that strategic 
mobility--the system of equipment, personnel, and logistical know-how for moving 
military forces over intercontinental distances--is more important than ever before. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) has reduced the number of U.S. troops stationed abroad, 
so the United States will need to deploy forces over a longer distance if it becomes 
involved in a foreign conflict. The ability to project large numbers of forces quickly has 
been a distinctive feature of the U.S. military. In the opinion of some analysts, it is one 
means of maintaining the nation's status as a superpower. [Ref. 1] 
Worldwide mobility for U.S. military forces is a fundamental precept in our 
national security strategy of engagement and enlargement.  Our strategy calls for the 
preparation and deployment of American military forces in the United States and abroad 
to support U.S. diplomacy in responding to key dangers -- those posed by weapons of 
mass destruction, regional aggression and threats to the stability of states.  Enhancement 
of our strategic mobility capability, including airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning, is 
already underway. We have taken delivery of the first 18 of the initial procurement of C-
17 advanced transport aircraft. One Army heavy brigade’s equipment set is pre-
positioned aboard ships now on station to cover contingencies from Northeast Asia to the 
Persian Gulf. Our plans call for three additional brigade sets to be pre-positioned ashore, 
two in Southwest Asia and one in South Korea. [Ref 1] 
Airlift operates across the range of military operations performing six broad tasks: 
deployment, employment, redeployment, sustainment, areomedical evacuation (AE), and 
military operations other than war, such as foreign humanitarian assistance and 
noncombatant evacuation operations. Airlift is a cornerstone of global force projection. It 
provides the means to rapidly deploy and redeploy forces, on short notice, to any location 
worldwide. Airlift’s characteristics — speed, flexibility, range, and responsiveness — 
complement other US mobility assets. The United States operates three distinct airlift 
forces; intertheater or strategic, theater or intratheater, and organic airlift forces. Airlift 
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delivery is accomplished by two basic modes, air land or aerial delivery. Air land is the 
most frequently used delivery method and encompasses all situations where personnel 
and cargo are onloaded and off-loaded while the aircraft is on the ground. Aerial delivery 
includes all methods of delivering personnel, equipment, and supplies from an airborne 
aircraft.   
The Army has the largest requirement for common-user airlift. In particular, 
Army light infantry, airborne, and air assault forces rely heavily on airlift for deployment, 
sustainment, employment, and redeployment. The Navy depends on common-user airlift 
to sustain forward deployed operations with personnel, materiel, and mail from the 
continental United States (CONUS) to overseas bases and forward logistics sites. Marine 
forces require common-user airlift for deployment into a theater as part of a maritime 
prepositioning force, as an air contingency force, or as a Marine expeditionary force 
afloat and/or ashore. Sustained Marine air-ground task force operations require strategic 
and intratheater common-user airlift support. Depending on the operation, the Air Force 
tends to be the second largest customer of common-user airlift. For deployment, Air 
Force unit aircraft self-deploy; however, unit support personnel and equipment require 
airlift to the destination with, or before, the deploying unit aircraft. Special operations 
forces (SOF) have specially configured aircraft dedicated to special operations. SOF are 
augmented by common-user airlift support. As a branch of the Armed Forces and a non-
DOD agency, the Coast Guard’s organic airlift is normally sufficient to satisfy its airlift 
requirements. Other non-DOD agencies use DOD airlift for activities such as 
noncombatant evacuation operations, counterdrug operations, foreign humanitarian 
assistance, and domestic support operations. Non-DOD agencies may use common-user 
airlift providing the DOD mission is not impaired. [Ref. 2:p. 7] 
Today, the ability to meet the operational objectives of power projection and force 
sustainment from the continental United States is the heart of the issue.   Because of this 
importance, air mobility has emerged as a crucial element in promoting the U.S. National 
Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement.  National security strategy depends on 
air mobility to protect America’s global interest.  As our nation moves away from 
forward overseas basing, we face the rapid mobility demands that a CONUS based, 
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expeditionary military presents.  To that end, airlift delivers the majority of the initial 
time-critical forces and war material to regional hot spots in support of expeditionary 
operations.  To meet these strategic needs, the United States armed forces rely on a core 
airlifter to accomplish both peacetime and contingency tasking. 
Today's airlift fleet is made up of both planes that are dedicated solely to military 
missions and commercial aircraft that are part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). If 
mobilized fully, the combined fleet would have a total theoretical airlift capacity of 
almost 50 million ton-miles per day. Nearly two-thirds of that amount comes from the 
military's own planes, with the rest contributed by civil carriers. [Ref. 3:Sec. 4] 
DoD's current fleet of strategic airlifters includes three types of cargo planes and 
two varieties of tanker aircraft. Tankers are generally used to refuel other aircraft while in 
flight, but DoD needs fewer planes for that role today than it did during the Cold War 
because there is less call for long-range missions by strategic nuclear bombers. Thus, 
military officials plan to use some tankers for airlift missions. Military cargo planes such 
as the C-141, C-5, and C-17 have special features that make them particularly well suited 
to moving military equipment, Figure 1. The C-5 and C-17 also have large doors and 
unobstructed cargo compartments that can carry the largest or most awkwardly shaped 
pieces of military equipment, such as tanks and helicopters. Military transports also have 
multiple sets of electrical and mechanical systems and other safety features so they can 




The C-141 can carry an average payload of 23 tons. It is the primary plane the Air 
Force would use to airdrop personnel and supplies over long distances. First built in the 
1960s, the average C-141 is nearly 30 years old. The Air Force plans to retire the planes 





With an average load of 65 tons, the C-5 is the largest of DoD's military airlift 
planes. Unlike the C-141, the C-5 was built to carry the biggest pieces of military 
equipment (called outsize cargo), such as M1 tanks. It has doors and ramps at both nose 
and tail so cargo can be loaded more quickly. 
 
 
Figure 1. DoD's Strategic Airlift Planes. 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
The C-17 is DoD's newest transport plane. Like the C-5, it can carry outsize 
cargo. However, it is closer in length to the C-141, so its average payload is smaller than 
the Galaxy's--45 tons. DoD says the C-17's size and maneuverability on the ground give 
it an advantage over larger planes when airfields are congested. 
By contrast, KC-10 and KC-135 tankers are modified versions of civil planes. 
Because of intense competition in the market for commercial airliners, civil transports are 
designed to carry loads of passengers, baggage, and cargo as cost-effectively as possible. 
With narrower cargo holds and smaller doors, civil transports are better suited for moving 
bulk cargo on standard-size pallets. On the down side, they require special elevators for 
loading and unloading since their cargo doors are higher off the ground. They also need 
longer runways than may be found in some parts of the world. But modern civil 
transports, such as the Boeing 747, are very reliable and can carry larger payloads over a 
longer range without refueling than most military airlift planes. [Ref: 1:Sec. 2] 
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B.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
With fewer combat units stationed abroad today, the United States needs strategic 
mobility forces to project its military might. But when federal funding is tightly 
constrained, it is important to revisit the issues of how much strategic mobility is enough 
and what mix of lift forces best suits the United States needs.  
Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 
coordinated three analyses of the U.S. military's strategic lift needs: the 1992 Mobility 
Requirements Study, the 1994 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update 
(MRS BURU) and Mobility Requirement Study 2005. Rather than looking at a broad 
range of scenarios in which the United States might need to move its forces, both 
analyses focused on a few scenarios that military planners believe will place the greatest 
demands on strategic mobility. However, because determining future lift requirements 
involves making a host of assumptions, the results of those and similar analyses are 
bound to be contentious. [Ref. 4] 
Airlift requirements set by DoD planners during the Cold War provide an 
example. During the early 1980s, DoD set a goal of purchasing 66 million ton-miles per 
day of airlift capacity--more than twice the level that existed at the time. The Congress 
invested considerable money to achieve that goal, including funds to buy C-5Bs and KC-
10s and to develop the C-17. But that substantial investment left DoD far short of its goal, 
with around 50 MTM/D of airlift capacity. And even the 66 MTM/D goal was not nearly 
large enough to address what defense officials thought they would need for a conflict 
with the Soviet Union; that level was lowered because of fiscal realities. 
Today, the Air Force's airlifters are enormous, and it is they who haul the Army's 
biggest vehicles, rather than the other way around. Moreover, experts predict, tomorrow's 
transports will be able to haul massive loads to any point on Earth within an hour, defend 
themselves en route, and land on parking lots.  
The C-141 aircraft, which has been the backbone of the military's airlift fleet, is 
nearing the end of its service life and has been under severe flight restrictions in recent 
years. The Air Mobility Command has temporarily expanded the use of commercial and 
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tanker aircraft for regularly scheduled cargo and passenger missions. It also plans to 
upgrade its strategic airlift simulator capacity, which will allow it to do more in-aircraft 
training. The Command, however, can do more. First, it can continue to use commercial 
and tanker aircraft to fly scheduled missions not requiring the unique capabilities of the 
C-141. Second, the Command can make maximum use of the upgraded simulators by 
transferring more of the air refueling and local proficiency training from the C-5 and C-
141. Moreover, it can institute a companion trainer aircraft program for the C-5 and C-
141. This program involves flying smaller, less-costly aircraft for training that does not 
require larger aircraft; this would be similar to programs that the Air Force and Command 
have for tanker aircraft. [Ref. 6] 
With about 190 operating, the C-141 is the most common airlift plane in the 
military fleet. Those aircraft provide nearly 9 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) of 
theoretical capacity--slightly less than a third of the total for military airlift planes in 
1996. The Air Force considers the C-141 its core airlifter because the plane can be used 
not only to deliver cargo but also to conduct special military missions such as air-
dropping Army paratroopers and their equipment.  
But the C-141 is reaching the end of its service life, and recent experience has led 
military leaders to question its reliability. In 1993, an Air Force advisory board 
recommended restricting the weight of cargo that each plane can carry. Inspection of the 
C-141 fleet revealed cracks in the weep holes where fuel circulates within the plane's 
wings, and in some wing boxes that secure the wings to the fuselage. The Air Force 
repaired some of its C-141s to retain fleet capacity over the next few years, but it also 
decided to accelerate the plane's retirement. Current plans call for withdrawing the C-141 
from active forces by 2003 and from reserve components by 2007.  
Because of the sheer number of C-141s in service, that plane has been considered 
the workhorse of the military's strategic airlift fleet. But nearly 50 percent of the 
military's theoretical airlift capacity comes from C-5s. Seventy-six A model aircraft were 
built during the early 1970s and were retrofitted with new wings during the mid-1980s. 
Beginning in 1986, the Air Force took delivery of 50 new C-5Bs.   
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Unfortunately, the C-5 (the older A model in particular) has been plagued by low 
rates of reliability and maintainability. During the Persian Gulf War, an average of more 
than 30 percent of the Air Force's C-5s were unavailable because they needed 
maintenance, lacked spare parts, or both. As it is flown and operated today, a C-5A 
requires about 56 hours of maintenance for every hour of flight, and the B model needs 
29 maintenance hours per flight hour. The Air Force is considering retiring its C-5As 
beginning in 2007--even though the average C-5A airframe has just 15,000 flight hours 
out of an expected service life of 30,000 hours. [Ref. 7] 
The Administration plans to use 120 C-17’s as the replacement workhorse for 
more than 200 C-141s. As of December 1996, the Air Force had contracted for 48 C-17s. 
Twenty-four of those are already operating and contribute about 3 MTM/D of DoD's 
theoretical airlift capacity. The C-17 has a system of thrust-reversers, flaps, and slats that 
allows it to land on short or ill-equipped airfields much as the C-130 (the Air Force's 
primary tactical airlift plane). Some military planners would like to use the C-17 to 
deliver cargo from the United States directly to airfields at the battlefront, rather than 
transferring equipment from main operating bases by ground transportation or on C-130s. 
Under the Administration's plan for multiyear procurement, C-17 purchases would cost 
$16.1 billion between 1998 and 2002, with the last planes being bought in 2003. [Ref. 
1:p. 24] 
C. RESOURCE PLANNING 
Airlift planners use three different types of planning approaches to accomplish 
national military objectives: resource planning, deliberate planning, and crisis action 
planning.  Within each of these approaches, models are used to gather and process data to 
yield usable information on strategic airlift operations.  For long-range strategic forecasts, 
resource planning is the most appropriate tool to accomplish our objectives.  Resource 
planning focuses on the two areas: capabilities and requirements. 
The capabilities planning and decrease in force structure are the realities of 
today’s strategic environment.  Currently, capability assessments determine our airlift 
force’s ability to meet lift demands from available resources. However, strategic airlift 
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requirements have to be examined because the DoD places demands on airlift to meet our 
mobility requirements. 
Requirements studies provide the information needed by using historical data and 
currents trends to estimate what our future strategic airlift demands may be.   The studies 
estimates the assets needed to meet our force requirements.  Because of their importance 
the resource planning and requirement studies have been guiding principles in our past. 
The 1992 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) established mobility requirements 
for the post-Cold War era. It defined baseline requirements for intertheater (or strategic) 
mobility and proposed a long-range investment plan to meet them. 
Specifically, the study validated the need for 120 C-17 aircraft and called for the 
acquisition of additional medium-speed sealift vessels and afloat prepositioning ships. A 
follow-on study, conducted in 1994, updated the original MRS findings to reflect changes 
in force structure and warfighting strategy resulting from the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.  
The Bottom-Up Review Update, or MRS BURU -- reaffirmed the need for increases in 
key mobility components. In particular, it validated the original MRS recommendation 
for the procurement of additional ships for afloat prepositioning and for surge 
deployments of forces based in the continental United States (CONUS). The MRS BURU 
also examined intertheater airlift requirements in detail. Based on the study's findings, 
DoD has established an intertheater airlift objective of between 49 and 52 million ton-
miles per day of cargo capacity. The precise amount of airlift needed will depend on the 
level of prepositioning that can be achieved overseas. The Department is continuing to 
evaluate prepositioning options, as well as other potential warfighting enhancements, that 
could result in changes to the airlift objective.  [Ref. 4:p. 3] 
The requirements established by the MRS BURU were based on an evaluation of 
mobility force needs for two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Mobility forces would be 
heavily involved in all phases of a major regional conflict, contributing both to the 
deployment and sustainment of combat forces. Immediately upon a decision to commit 
forces, ground units and aviation support elements would be dispatched to the region 
from bases in the United States and abroad. These forces would deploy by air, and would 
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draw the bulk of their equipment and supplies from stocks prepositioned for them on land 
or afloat. They would be joined in the theater by additional Marine ground units arriving 
on amphibious ships. Combat aircraft would self-deploy, relying on tankers for aerial-
refueling support en route to their destination. These early-deploying forces, operating in 
conjunction with naval units at sea, would mount an initial defense and secure ports and 
airfields for the arrival of follow-on forces. Studies and war games have confirmed that 
the prompt availability of forces in a conflict theater is critical not only to the initial 
defense but to the successful execution of the entire warfighting strategy.  
As the buildup continues, heavy combat and support forces would begin arriving 
by sea, with fast sealift ships making the first deliveries. Airlift would continue moving 
personnel and high-priority supplies and equipment into the theater. Once sufficient 
forces were available, a large-scale, air-land counteroffensive would be launched. 
Mobility forces would provide critical support for this phase of the operation, delivering 
reinforcements and any additional equipment and supplies needed to sustain combat.  
Once the conflict has ended, mobility forces would begin returning U.S. troops to 
their regular operating locations at home and abroad. Mobility forces also would provide 
critical support for any residual forces that remained in the theater, delivering the supplies 
and other material needed to sustain the forces' presence. 
While the MRS-BURU assumed that "all allied nations would support mobility 
operations," it didn't consider that an ally might either contribute some lift capability of 
its own or deny host nation support, especially if it is under threat of weapons of mass 
destruction. The MRS-05 will use the concept of "fort-to-foxhole" operations, and 
include constraints at CONUS bases, the en route system, and the processing capacity at 
receiving ports overseas. The MRS-BURU focused only on strategic lift, port-to-port, and 
some en route capacity. 
The MRS-05 examined the number and the mix of mobility systems needed to 
support two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.  The MTW scenarios recognized the 
increased complexity involved in deploying forces from a posture of global engagement 
and in responding to asymmetric attacks by enemy forces, including attacks using 
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chemical weapons.  MRS-05 constituted an end-to-end analysis, investigating mobility 
requirements in the continental United States as well as between theaters and within 
individual theaters. 
The programmed 2005 force structure was moved through the 2005-projected 
defense transportation system according to the deployment schedule reflected in the 
Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPS).  The timing of unit equipment arrivals and the 
sustainment necessary to support arriving equipment was assessed using campaign-level 
ground, naval, and air combat models.  Risk was assessed based on the US/coalition 
forces ability to achieve measurable warfighting objectives.  Improvements to the defense 
transportation system were examined when warfighting outcomes did not meet 
acceptable criteria. [Ref. 1:p. 23] 
The MRS-05 drew on large volumes of data in defining mobility requirements for 
FY 2005.  The Services provided time-phased force deployment data.  The data was 
derived from POM estimates for FY 2005, intelligence assessments, treaties and 
agreements and war plans. 
D. REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT 
The MRS-05 study identified several areas where improvements were needed. 
Pre-positioning, surge sealift, inter-theater lift capability and CONUS transportation 
assets were all within satisfactory areas.  As established in the MRS-BURU, an airlift 
fleet of 49.7 MTM/D was not adequate to meet the full range of requirements.  The 
shortfall was attributed to the newly identified intra-theater lift requirements and to 
missions in addition to supporting the two MTW scenarios. 
The airlift analysis considered a variety of different missions.  It reviewed the 
missions that directly supported the two simultaneous MTWs.  From this assessment, the 
study identified a requirement for 51.1 MTM/D of airlift capability.  This figure 
accounted for deployments to the two theater wars and support for high priority 
movements within the theaters. 
The MRS-05 evaluated the planning assumptions that would affect the availability 
of airlift in critical peak periods.  The study generated an airlift requirement of 67 
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MTM/D.  However, three missions were judged as the highest priority additions to the 
initial 51.1 MTM/D needed for major theater warfighting.  The three high priority 
missions, conducting special operations, deploying missile defense systems to friendly 
nations and supporting other theater commanders not directly engaged in the theater, 
increase the 51.1 MTM/D to 54.5 MTM/D. [Ref. 8:p. 37]  
To establish an airlift objective within the range of the analysis, and to develop a 
program to meet the objective, a balance between capability and a risk of overall defense 
priorities will have to be considered.  DoD must determine the mix of its investment to 
achieve airlift objectives by investing in C-17’s or enhancing the C-5s. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Every analysis of mobility requires a vast number of assumptions. Those 
assumptions can be grouped in three broad categories: the nature of whom the United 
States might need to fight and how that foe might prosecute an attack; which U.S. forces 
will be sent to the conflict and whether they would be ready to deploy; and whether 
military and commercial planes and ships will be available and operate as expected. So 
much uncertainty surrounds each of those issues that there is room for debate over almost 
any assumption that planner’s make. 
Probably no mobility analysis can definitely settle how much lift is enough and 
what combination of mobility forces best suits the needs of the United States. Ultimately, 
that is a subjective judgment in which decision makers must balance the cost of investing 
in mobility forces against the capabilities that those forces provide. 
Mobility planners, less directly exposed to risk, tend to use fairly optimistic 
assumptions about what the United States could deliver early in a conflict. In the MRS 
BURU, for example, mobility planners assumed that reserve personnel would be called 
up quickly, that the weather would be clear, and that DoD would supplement its military 
airlift and sealift fleets quickly with commercial transportation. One assumption to which 
the MRS BURU is perhaps most sensitive is that decision makers receive unambiguous 
warning of an attack and then act quickly on that intelligence. Unfortunately, history is 
replete with examples of how leaders saw warnings of an impending attack and yet failed 
to act.  
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Besides uncertainty, another problem inherent in determining lift requirements is 
that planning for a major deployment involves two very different communities of military 
analysts: those who prepare for combat operations and those who plan to deliver the 
forces. Historically, war fighters and mobility planners have approached their task from 
widely different viewpoints. War fighters, such as regional commanders, face the 
consequences of risk most directly, so they make plans to deploy a large enough force to 
ensure dominance on the battlefield.  Chapter III will examine the requirements in terms 









III. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES 
A. FORCE RESTRUCTURING 
U.S. planning for major theater conflict focuses on deterring and, if necessary, 
fighting and defeating aggression by potentially hostile regional powers, such as North 
Korea, Iran or Iraq. Such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces, which can 
cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States, 
with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a potentially 
aggressive neighbor. To deter aggression, prevent coercion of allied or friendly 
governments and, ultimately, defeat aggression should it occur, we must prepare our 
forces to confront this scale of threat, preferably in concert with our allies and friends, but 
unilaterally if necessary. To do this, we must have forces that can deploy quickly and 
supplement U.S. forward-based and forward-deployed forces, along with regional allies, 
in halting an invasion and defeating the aggressor, just as we demonstrated by our rapid 
response in October 1994 when Iraq threatened aggression against Kuwait. [Ref. 1] 
How do planners decide what type and amount of strategic lift is best? The 
authors of the MRS BURU first identified how much force they believed the United 
States would need to halt enemy assaults on the Korean Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf 
region. Using computer simulations of combat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other DoD 
analysts tried to establish when certain units would need to arrive in order to limit the 
amount of risk faced by the forces that deployed earliest. Then, using simulations of 
cargo deliveries, they determined what combinations of mobility forces would allow DoD 
to meet those timelines. 
Every analysis of mobility requires a vast number of assumptions. Those 
assumptions can be grouped in three broad categories: the nature of whom the United 
States would need to fight and how that foe might prosecute an attack; which U.S. forces 
would be sent to the conflict and whether they would be ready to deploy; and whether 
military and commercial planes and ships would be available and would operate as 
expected. So much uncertainty surrounds each of those issues that there is room for 
debate over almost any assumption that planners make. Probably no mobility analysis can 
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definitely settle how much lift is enough and what combination of mobility forces best 
suits the needs of the United States. Ultimately, that is a subjective judgment in which 
decision makers must balance the cost of investing in mobility forces against the 
capabilities that those forces would provide.  
Besides uncertainty, another problem inherent in determining lift requirements is 
that planning for a major deployment involves two very different communities of military 
analysts: those who prepare for combat operations and those who plan to deliver the 
forces. Historically, war fighters and mobility planners have approached their task from 
widely different viewpoints. War fighters, such as regional commanders, face the 
consequences of risk most directly, so they make plans to deploy a large enough force to 
ensure dominance on the battlefield.   
Mobility planners, less directly exposed to risk, tend to use fairly optimistic 
assumptions about what the United States could deliver early in a conflict. In the MRS 
BURU, for example, mobility planners assumed that reserve personnel would be called 
up quickly, that the weather would be clear, and that DoD would supplement its military 
airlift and sealift fleets quickly with commercial transportation. One assumption to which 
the MRS BURU is perhaps most sensitive is that decision makers would receive 
unambiguous warning of an attack and then act quickly on that intelligence. 
Unfortunately, history is replete with examples of how leaders saw warnings of an 
impending attack and yet failed to act.  
The role each type of strategic lift plays in a conflict is matched to its general 
characteristics. For example, because of its speed, airlift is used to deliver troops and 
equipment in the earliest stages of a military crisis. But airlift is many times more 
expensive than sealift, making it impractical for moving large numbers of forces or units 
with heavy tanks and armored vehicles. Sealift is much slower than airlift, but each large 
sealift ship can deliver the equivalent of more than 300 loads of a C-141, today's most 
common type of airlift plane. By prepositioning materiel, DoD can deploy large numbers 
of heavy forces much more quickly than with sealift and much more cheaply than with 
airlift. However, planners must select sites for prepositioned equipment carefully and 
recognize that political and diplomatic factors can limit how DoD uses that equipment. 
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Since DoD bases its numerical requirements for strategic mobility on its plans to fight 
major conflicts, it is important to understand how military officials believe those conflicts 
will take place. [Ref. 9] 
B.  PLANNING FOCUS 
DoD analyses depict three phases of a large-scale conflict. During the halting 
phase, U.S. and allied forces would deploy to blunt an initial assault by an aggressor, 
minimize the amount of territory the invader takes over, and defend sites that are 
important for continuing military operations, such as ports, airfields, and supply centers. 
If the United States had to operate with little warning and an enemy's attack proceeded 
swiftly, airlift and prepositioning might be the only means of delivering forces during the 
halting phase. Under DoD's assumptions about conflicts in the Korean Peninsula or the 
Persian Gulf region, the first U.S. heavy ground forces would have to arrive within two to 
three weeks to halt an initial assault. Given the distances involved, that requirement for 
early combat units would place the greatest demand on U.S. mobility forces. [Ref. 5] 
Once an aggressor had been stopped, the United States would focus its efforts on 
deploying additional combat forces and logistical support to the region. During that 
buildup phase, U.S. troops would try to reduce the enemy's military capabilities through 
sustained attacks. After enough forces had been deployed to the region, the United States 
and its allies would launch a counterattack, a large-scale offensive using air and land 
forces to push back the enemy and regain lost territory.  
Ideally, civilian and military leaders would receive early, unambiguous warning 
of an impending enemy assault and would take a few measured steps to deter it. In 
military parlance, those steps are called flexible deterrent options--measures aimed at 
deterring enemy advances or aiding military deliveries that can be taken before the 
official decision to deploy forces en masse and can be revised quickly if the situation 
changes. 
Such measures might include sending an aircraft carrier, a Marine expeditionary 
unit, or a squadron of fighter aircraft to the region or taking steps to prepare equipment at 
prepositioning sites. If an enemy attack occurred quickly and with little warning, 
however, airlift would be the only way to move equipment and supplies to the region 
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until the closest prepositioned equipment arrived. Units that would have priority for early 
airlift missions might include equipment to provide air defenses, transportation units that 
operate ports and airfields, light Army units, supplies to set up bases for air forces, initial 
squadrons of fighters and bombers, and some special-operations forces.  
But there is a limit to what airlift can do. Although it can deliver light Army units 
quickly, the same is not true for units with more than a handful of tanks, since even the 
largest military cargo planes can carry only one or two of those vehicles at a time. Thus, 
DoD cannot rely on airlift to complete deliveries of heavy Army units within the halting 
phase of a conflict. For that reason, military planners have begun prepositioning 
equipment for Army brigades with tanks and heavy vehicles in or closer to regions where 
they believe conflict is most likely.  
Not all equipment can be prepositioned. Military logisticians do not plan to 
preposition helicopters, radars, radios, or certain missiles because they are too few in 
number or too difficult to maintain. Thus, although prepositioning reduces DoD's need to 
transport some cargo by air, airlift would still deliver the remaining equipment and the 
troops who operate it (so-called fly-in echelons). If DoD plans to deploy a large number 
of heavy forces quickly in a conflict, the size of those fly-in echelons could be 
substantial, driving up requirements for early airlift missions.  
After halting the attack, military commanders would send follow-on Army and 
Marine units and supplies to sustain the operation, with most arriving by sealift from the 
United States. Other supplies and equipment prepositioned on board ships would also 
steam to the region, including units to develop more extensive logistical supply lines. 
Airlift would transport equipment for aircraft squadrons, lighter ground forces, and key 
units such as corps-level artillery. Those deliveries would continue until military leaders 
believed they had enough forces and logistical support to launch a counterattack.    
US forces will transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global 
engagement with substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple 
concurrent Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) operations. In the event of one major 
theater war, the United States would need to be extremely selective in making any 
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additional commitments to either engagement activities or SSC operations. The United 
States would likely also choose to begin disengaging from those activities and operations 
not deemed to involve vital US interests in order to better posture its forces to deter the 
possible outbreak of a second war. In the event of two such conflicts, US forces would be 
withdrawn from peacetime engagement activities and SSC operations as quickly as 
possible to be readied for war. The risks associated with disengaging from a range of 
peacetime activities and operations in order to deploy the appropriate forces to the 
conflicts could be mitigated, at least in part, by replacing withdrawing forces with an 
increased commitment of reserve component forces, coalition or allied forces, host nation 
capabilities, contractor support, or some combination thereof. [Ref 3] 
The principal requirement is to mount an initial defense while rapidly deploying 
large US reinforcements from CONUS. The principal risk is losing some territory in the 
initial stages that might be hard to regain. Although US and allied forces would almost 
certainly win both wars, it might require a costly struggle. In all likelihood, only one war 
would erupt at any single moment, but the United States would withhold sufficient forces 
to deter a second war, and to win should it occur. The United States would probably 
deploy only about half its available combat posture to each theater. 
Moreover, the factors that entered into DoD's numerical requirements for mobility 
forces are numerous and complicated. For those reasons, this study reviews the 
Administration's investment blueprint for the three types of mobility forces, addresses 
how military planners developed that plan, and evaluates several alternatives for 
modernizing strategic mobility. 
C.  CAPABILITIES  
The MRS BURU recommended that DoD procure enough airlift planes to provide 
between 49.4 and 51.8 million ton-miles per day of theoretical airlift capacity. Rather 
than specifying a single requirement, the study set that range depending on how much 
more equipment military planners are able to preposition. If defense officials can add 
280,000 square feet to prepositioned stocks, 49.4 MTM/D might provide enough 
capability to complete deliveries for the halting phases of two major conflicts with an 
acceptable level of risk. However, if DoD cannot preposition more forces or if the Army's 
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afloat prepositioning is not held in reserve for a conflict in the Persian Gulf, the study's 
authors believe more airlift is advisable. [Ref. 4:p. 4] 
Successful U.S. power projection lies in our ability to field a modern strategic-
airlift fleet, sufficient in both numbers and capability.  This fleet must have adequate 
capacity, range, and versatility to meet the broad spectrum of military requirements.  The 
core airlift problem becomes the C-141 as it retires and is replaced by the C-17.  How do 
we meet the requirements driven by a near-simultaneous two MRC scenario?  What 
number of C-17s is sufficient and what should the force mixture be to meet necessary 
airlift requirements?  
Military planners divide airlift loads into three sizes: bulk loads that fit on a 
standard pallet, oversize loads that are larger than bulk loads but will fit in a C-141, and 
outsize loads that can fit only in a C-5 or C-17. Since the military uses many heavy 
vehicles and awkwardly shaped pieces of equipment, having transport planes that can 
accommodate that cargo is important.  
The mix of equipment DoD would airlift to a major regional contingency today 
differs from what it planned to send for a conflict with the Soviet Union. According to a 
1981 study of mobility requirements, 27 percent (by weight) of the equipment that DoD 
planned to send to a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict within the first two weeks was outsize. 
By comparison, DoD's more recent simulations of deployments to Korea and the Persian 
Gulf region suggest that 15 percent to 18 percent of airlift deliveries over a similar period 
would be outsize. Official data for the first two weeks of Operation Desert Shield are 
unavailable, but during the first month of deployments, approximately 10 percent (by 
weight) of the cargo loads were outsize and half were bulk.  [Ref. 5] 
The decline in the relative need to carry outsize cargo is an important issue in 
deciding how many military planes like the C-17 are necessary. One advantage of C-17s 
and C-5s over civil-style planes is their ability to carry such cargo. However, if a large 
proportion of the equipment that DoD plans to send can fit on modified civil-style planes, 
DoD might need fewer C-17s. 
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The Clinton administration recommended acquiring 120 C-17s for strategic airlift, 
then increased the number to 134 in 2001.  Cost and capabilities were compared across 
the C-17, the C-5D, and the C-33, a military version of the 747.  In addition, in the study 
a Strategic Airlift Forces Mix Analysis was conducted to compare the relative 
performance of the fleet of C-17s against a mix of C-5D and C-33 fleets in conjunction 
with fewer C-17s.  The study determined that certain combinations of C-17s and a mix of 
other airlift fleets could transport almost as much cargo to major regional conflicts as a 
fleet of 120 C-17s.  However, the study also determined that although some mixed fleet 
combinations were less expensive, the study favored the C-17.  The mixed fleet could not 
transport as much outsized cargo as the fleet of C-17s.  Also, additional aircraft loaders 
would be required for the C-33 that could reach the height of the 747’s cargo floor. [Ref. 
5] 
The cost of airlift options centered on the number of C-17s in a given fleet, which 
demonstrated correlation between an increase in MTM/D with the increase in the number 
of C-17s.  The MRS BURU seemingly proceeded along the assumption that more airlift 
available to transport military forces translated into reduced risk.  The results 
recommended modernizing mobility air forces with the C-17.  The option recommended 
by the Clinton’s administration was to acquire the smallest possible number of C-17s. 
The MRS BURU recommended acquiring enough air lifters to transport between 
49.4 and 51.8 MTM/D.  The exact amount of MTM/D depends on the amount of 
prepositioned equipment.  If USTRANSCOM can preposition enough equipment, 49.4 
MTM/D would suffice to airlift the remaining cargo required for the halt phases of two 
major theater wars with an acceptable risk. According to the MRS BURU, acquiring 120 
C-17s, plus the additional 14 that have been requested, would provide USTRANSCOM 
with 49.4 MTM/D of airlift capability.  However, achieving any higher levels of airlift 
would require more C-17s or airlift capability.  Based on the Army’s requirements and 
assuming they prepositioned material; USTRANSCOM would increase the requirement 




D.  AIRLIFT CARGO CLASSIFICATION 
AMC measures airlift capacity as MTM/D, which has allowed for a quick 
comparison.  How does AMC determine MTM/D?  They use a mathematical product of 
four factors: objective utilization rate, blockspeed, payload and productivity.  The first 
factor, the objective utilization rate, is the average flight hours per day flown by aircraft 
in primary aircraft authorization (PAA) in service assigned to flying squadrons.  The 
second factor, blockspeed, is the average ground speed in nautical miles (NM) per hour 
from takeoff to a block distance of 2,500 NM.  The third factor, payload, is based on the 
average payload per aircraft as experienced in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  
The fourth factor, productivity, takes into account the aircraft returning from its 
offloading location to its next onloading location, which varies depending on the 
distances to these locations.  The most important factors in understanding the limits of 
airlift capability are aircraft objective utilization rates and cargo classifications. 
AMC employs three size classifications for loads; the choice of airframes 
available to transport classifications of cargo decreases as the size increases.  The first 
classification, bulk cargo, is general cargo loaded on a standard pallet size (108 inches by 
8 inches) or containers.  A number of different airframes, including both military and 
commercial aircraft, commonly transport bulk cargo.  The second classification, 
oversized cargo, is larger than bulk but less than outsized cargo.  Two criteria define 
oversized cargo: palletized with an extended height of 96 inches or cargo with maximum 
dimensions of 105 inches in height, 109 inches in length and 117 inches in width. [Ref. 8] 
Currently, the only aircraft capable of carrying oversize cargo are the C-5, C-17, C-141, 
KC-10 and C-130.  The third classification, outsize cargo, exceeds the dimensions of 
oversized cargo and requires either the C-5 or C-17 for transportation.  Because of 
AMC’s restriction on carrying the larger cargo classifications, the aircraft play an 
essential role in determining whether mobility objectives are met. [Ref. 8:p. 45] 
Comparing the required MTM/D from the MRS BURU study and the actual 
MTM/D available from existing airframe platforms, there is a 5.8 MTM/D shortfall.  This 
shortfall was made up of the following classifications: 33 percent outsize and 67 percent 
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oversize (fig 1).  The short falls occurred because of the restricted cargo capabilities of 
the airframes at AMC’s disposal and limited number of airframes capable of transporting 
outsize and oversize cargo.  The airlift fleet has been divided into three categories.  The 
first category includes both the C-17 and C-5 because they are capable of carrying bulk, 
outsize and oversize cargo.  The second category includes both C-141 and KC-10 
because they are capable of carrying bulk and oversize cargo.  The third category 
includes commercial aircraft because they can only carry bulk cargo due to their low 




Figure 2. 49.7 Million Ton Miles Per Day. 
 
E. MOBILITY AIRCRAFTS 
Today's airlift fleet is made up of both planes that are dedicated solely to military 
missions and commercial aircraft that are part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). If 
mobilized fully, the combined fleet would have a total theoretical airlift capacity of 
almost 50 million ton-miles per day. Nearly two-thirds of that amount comes from the 
military's own planes, with the rest contributed by civil carriers (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 3. Theoretical Capacity of the Strategic Airlift Fleet Under the 
Administration's Plan, 1996-2007. 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of the Air Force, 1997 Air Mobility Master 
Plan (Scott Air Force Base, Ill.: Air Mobility Command, October 11, 1996).  
 
NOTE: Theoretical capacity is based on standard planning factors of the Air Force's Air Mobility 
Command. Based on a 1995 study of mobility needs and later analysis, the Department of Defense set a 
requirement of 49.7 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) for theoretical capacity. To reach that level, the 
Air Force plans to supplement military planes with Civil Reserve Air Fleet capacity, which would amount 
to 20.5 MTM/D or less over the 1996-2007 period.  
 
The C-141 fleet is the backbone of strategic airlift, yet it only contributes 5.6 
MTM/D of the MRS BURU objective of 49.7 MTM/D.  A fleet of 266 C-141 airlifters 
transported cargo during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  The C-141 can 
transport 13 pallets a distance of 3,130 NM; and when aerially refueled it can fly 
anywhere in the world.  Unfortunately, the C-141 has reached the end of service life; the 
fleet’s retirement has begun and is scheduled for completion by 2006. [Ref. 1] 
In a fully loaded configuration, the C-5 can transport 36 pallets and 73 passengers 
but requires aerial refueling to go beyond its fully loaded range of only 830 NM.  
However, with aerial refueling the C-5 can transport 13.2 MTM/D at the required 75 
percent MC rates.  However, the C-5 has actually averaged 7.07 MTM/D.  Nearly 50 
percent of the MTM/D shortfall, 2.7 MTM/D, resulted from the C-5s poor 59.4% MC 
rate.  To help improve the C-5’s performance, a Reliability Enhancement and 
Reengineering Program has been proposed.  This program includes engine replacement.  
The new high turbine engines will work to 2,500 hours, which is twice the current engine 
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life of 1,200 hours.  The enhancement program would increase the MC rate to 75 percent. 
[Ref. 8:p. 49] 
The growing C-17 fleet will become the new backbone of airlift for AMC.  The 
C-17 contributes 4.9 MTM/D to the total airlift capability.  The C-17 has a 90 percent 
MC rate, with the capacity for 18 pallets or 102 passengers that will eventually provide 
approximately 16.5 MTM/D once all 134 requested C-17s are in service.  As additional 
C-17s enter service in PAA billets among different squadrons, the outsized and oversized 
cargo shortfalls should subside.  The C-17 has range limitations because development 
was a compromise.  Thus, the C-17 has a short range for a strategic airlifter, which makes 
it very tanker intensive when fully loaded.  To resolve the situation, extended range tanks 
have been proposed that would provide an additional 67,000 pounds of fuel in an added 
center-wing fuel tank.  This new tank will add range to the C-17, which turn will reduce 
the C-17’s dependency on tanker support or en route refueling stops.  Another limitation 
is its inability to perform continuous direct delivery on a on a dirt runway.  C-17s can 
direct deliver to a concrete runway on a continuous basis, but can deliver cargo on a dirt 
runway only once, maybe twice, because of the physical properties of the dirt. [Ref. 7]  
After the first landing, the aircraft’s landing wheels cut ruts into the airstrip’s dirt surface.  
The next aircraft landing cuts more ruts into the surface and so on until the airstrip is 
finally too torn up for landings.  However, the C-17 can provide continuous flow using 
concrete-capped runways, which the Army Corps of Engineers can build within days at 
little cost. [Ref. 9] 
The C-130 is AMC’s core intratheater airlifter and compromises the Air Force’s 
most varied fleet, with 21 different models and variants.  The C-130 lacks interoperability 
within the fleet.  For example, a crewmember that flies a C-130E cannot fly a C-130H3 
because they are different aircraft.  Sixty-three percent of the fleet is in the ANG and the 
AFRES.  When a mix of active duty, Guard and Reserve forces support an operation, 
they form rainbow units at their deployed location, which results in manning and 
scheduling problems.  Difference in equipment types causes crew qualifications 
differences that create a situation where C-130 crews are not interchangeable.  These 
differences influence force operational effectiveness, which constrains the theater 
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commander’s operation.  Furthermore, each type of aircraft requires unique maintenance; 
unique mobility readiness spares package kit construction, and unique support equipment.  
The C-130 fleet is also an older fleet that requires upgrading.  Ninety-three percent of the 
active duty aircrafts were built before 1978, 69 percent of the ANG aircraft were built 
after 1978, and 74 percent of the AFRES aircraft were built after 1982.  Support for this 
aging fleet is increasing at 17 percent annually.  In addition, mandated navigation and 
safety requirements drive the need to update avionics.  [Ref. 8:p. 49] 
The KC-10 is AMC’s newest fleet of aircraft other than the C-17; the average age 
of the fleet is 16 years.  The KC-10 is a modified DC-10 commercial aircraft, which can 
carry a maximum cargo weight of 55 tons on 27 pallets; its maximum load-carrying 
capability is 170 tons, which could be all fuel or fuel and cargo combined.  As is the case 
with commercial aircraft, the KC-10 requires special loading equipment to lift cargo high 
enough to reach the aircraft’s floor.  Out of 54 KC-10 aircraft, AMC plans to augment its 
airlift fleet with an additional 37 during a single theater war, contributing 3.1 MTM/D to 
the total airlift capacity.  Thus, only 17 KC-10s will be available as tankers during a 
major theater war, where operations tempo would dictate a need for more tankers. 
The KC-135’s primary mission during the Cold War was aerial refueling for 
SAC’s armada of nuclear bombers, and it is still the backbone of aerial refueling.  The 
KC-135 requires upgrades to meet mandated requirements in the aerospace environment.  
The avionic replacement program currently under way to achieve this is called PACER 
CRAG, which performs a number avionic upgrades to the aircraft. Another problem that 
has to be addressed is the insufficient crew ratio that has occurred in every operation 
from desert Shield to Allied Force.  During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
USCENTCOM required a KC-135 crew ratio of 2:0, but the manning level set at 1.27:0 
coupled with the high number of tankers required in theater and for air bridge support, 
this created an impossible situation.  The KC-135 is one of the Air Force’s oldest in-
service aircraft, with an average fleet age of 39 years; it has been the backbone of aerial 
refueling for 45 years.  It has been projected to retire beginning in 2013 and continuing 
through 2040.  The MRS-05 studied aerial refueling alternatives to ensure actions were 
being reviewed before KC-135 retirement. [Ref. 9] 
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CRAF is a voluntary partnership between DoD and commercial air carriers 
designed to provide additional passenger and cargo planes and areomedical evacuation 
services to the military during times of crisis. Both cargo and passenger air carriers 
participate in one of three stages of the program, which reflect the priority with which 
planes might be called into service. Planes in Stage I would be called into service. 
If a national emergency occurred today, commercial passenger planes would carry 
the vast majority of all military personnel who would be deployed to a major conflict. If 
fully mobilized, cargo carriers who participate in the program would contribute up to 
27.8 MTM/D. However, participation in CRAF has fluctuated over time, so the Air Force 
only counts on about 20.5 MTM/D of cargo capacity from CRAF in its long-term 
planning. [Ref. 1] 
F.   MISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGIC AIRLIFT 
DoD officials base their numerical requirements for strategic airlift planes on two 
types of capabilities: the ability to deploy cargo, both during peacetime and in a major 
regional conflict; and the ability to perform special military missions, such as air-
dropping forces after traveling long distances. Although civil-style planes can help meet 
the first need, the Administration contends that DoD requires large numbers of military 
aircraft for the second. 
1. Major Conflict Operations 
Mobility air forces deploy fighters to locations in-theater.  Tankers move the 
fighters from CONUS to the theater of operations, where the fighters arrive ready to 
perform their missions.  While working in the theater, fighters also rely on tankers to 
sustain them with fuel while airborne so that they can continually engage any airborne 
adversary without flying back to their base of operations to refuel their aircraft. 
Sustaining combat air forces with materials and equipment once they are 
deployed in-theater requires ALOCs.  Strategic airlifters require aerial refueling because 
they transit from the CONUS to operations in different theaters around the globe.  
Strategic airlifters transport cargo to aerial ports where air mobility support units transfer 
the cargo from the strategic airlifters to tactical airlifters.  The tactical airlifters, in turn, 
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transport the cargo to combat forces at their crease with the Air Force’s objective for 
achieving agile logistic support and the focused logistics concept identified.   
2. Cargo Support for Other Operations 
Because of the amount of equipment and supplies needed to fight two major 
regional contingencies, that planning scenario has driven DoD's assessment of its overall 
requirements for airlift, sealift, and prepositioning. But lesser regional contingencies may 
pose different problems for strategic lift. For example, the United States may need to 
deploy into places that are landlocked or far from ports, which would call for more airlift 
planes or greater use of ground transportation. And unlike Korea or the Persian Gulf 
region, which have modern airfields and ports, some areas lack long runways, deep ports, 
and equipment to unload planes and ships. Planning for those sorts of situations can raise 
DoD's requirements for planes and ships that have unique military features. Most 
recently, defense officials looked at examples of smaller operations to decide how many 
C-17s DoD would need to conduct such missions quickly. Thus, Congress may want to 
consider whether alternative investments in mobility forces include enough C-17s to 
deliver cargo to smaller operations under timelines laid out by DoD. But, as discussed 
earlier, the exact nature of future missions is highly uncertain. There is also room for 
debate about whether DoD must precisely meet the timelines set by military planners or 
whether policymakers are willing to accept a somewhat slower (and thus riskier) 
deployment. [Ref. 10] 
A 1995 DoD analysis concluded that 40 C-17s could deliver cargo to any of three 
representative cases of smaller operations, involving Peacekeeping Missions, 
Humanitarian Assistance, and Evacuations of Noncombatants, with little risk of an 
extensive delay. DoD's analysis did not evaluate how many C-17s the United States 
would need if it became involved in several cases simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
United States may need to deploy larger numbers of troops to enforce peace between 
rivals, such as in the current U.S. operations in Bosnia. That type of operation would be 
smaller than a major regional conflict, but would probably involve more troops, heavier 
equipment, and tighter schedules than, say, a peacekeeping deployment. Thus, peace 
enforcement missions could place greater demands on airlift and raise requirements for 
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military planes such as the C-17.  In a recent analysis of peace enforcement missions, 
DoD planners found that an airlift fleet between 72 and 86 C-17s could deploy U.S. 
forces within a time frame that they characterized as having moderate risk. If the 
Congress chose to include more C-17s in its mobility purchases, that level of risk might 
fall because the United States could probably conduct the deployment more quickly. 
Alternatively, DoD could buy fewer than 72 C-17s and accept somewhat slower airlift 
deliveries to such a mission. [Ref. 2] 
3. Special Airlift Missions 
Long-Range Airdrops of Large Forces are another requirement; the Army must be 
prepared to deploy brigade-size forces anywhere in the world within a short time frame. 
To that end, military planners must prepare to air-drop a "medium-force package" 
consisting of more than 2,500 troops and some of their equipment that have traveled 
intercontinental distances. (After the airdrop, cargo planes would deliver additional 
equipment to reinforce those units from airfields that the paratroopers had seized.) 
Defense officials believe that once the C-141 is retired from service, DoD will need at 
least 100 C-17s in its inventory to conduct such a large airdrop at a moderate level of 
risk. With a smaller number of planes, the United States could not insert its forces as 
quickly, and thus such a mission would be riskier. Alternatively, defense officials 
contend a fleet with 120 C-17s would ensure that DoD could deliver brigade-size forces 
within the timelines laid out by military planners. Army officials believe that DoD would 
need at least 120 C-17s for that mission.  
Intratheater deliveries require additional assets that were not considered until 
MRS-05.  Rather than devoting all of DoD's C-17s to strategic airlift, regional 
commanders would like to devote one or two squadrons to moving key pieces of 
equipment within a theater of operations. A 1995 DoD analysis concluded that the Air 
Force could conduct a strategic airlift deployment to DoD's major planning scenarios 
with mixtures of 86 to 100 C-17s, when combined with additional planes like the C-33. If 
military commanders chose to use some C-17s for intratheater deliveries, however, DoD 
would need to buy more of those aircraft.  Because of this analysis, the 120 C-17 
requirement was increased to 134.  With fewer planes; DoD might not have enough to 
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devote to intratheater deliveries without significantly slowing the pace of deliveries from 
the United States. Alternatively, military planners would have to rely on trains and trucks 
to move outsize cargo. [Ref. 8:p. 62] 
Direct Deliveries are even more critical, because the C-17 can carry outsize cargo 
and land at short, ill-equipped airfields.  Military planners who prepare for combat might 
prefer that the Air Force deliver cargo directly from the United States close to a 
battlefield. Congress may want to consider whether using some C-17s in that way would 
significantly slow down deployments from the United States. According to DoD's 
analysis, airlift fleets with as few as 72 C-17s, when combined with additional C-33s, 
would allow the United States to conduct some direct deliveries but still keep an airlift 
deployment to a major regional conflict going at a pace associated with moderate risk.  
Fewer C-17s (or fleets with 72 C-17s but no C-33s) would slow that pace and, in the 
opinion of defense officials, unacceptably raise the risk that DoD could not complete its 
deliveries quickly enough. Alternatively, DoD could continue to conduct its airlift 
deployments the way it has in the past: delivering equipment to larger bases farther away 
from combat and then using trucks, railways, and smaller planes to move the equipment 
forward. [Ref. 8:p. 63] 
G.  OPTIONS FOR MODERNIZING TO SUPPORT STRATEGIC LIFT  
The authors of the MRS BURU evaluated the military benefits of delivering 
combat forces more quickly by judging whether earlier arrivals would reduce the risk 
facing U.S. forces. But the uncertainties in analyzing mobility requirements are 
enormous-- so large that some mobility experts believe that analysis alone cannot answer 
how much lift is enough.  The Department of Defense's requirements for mobility forces 
are open to question because they hinge on a large number of assumptions about how 
major deployments will take place. First, there is the nature of future conflicts: which 
aggressors might the United States face? How would they prosecute an attack? How 
much warning might leaders have? Will the United States have support from host nations 
or coalition partners? Second, there is uncertainty about which U.S. forces would be sent 
to the conflict, and whether they are adequately trained and ready to deploy. Finally, 
there are uncertainties about whether military and commercial transportation would be 
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available when needed and would perform as expected. These uncertainties are so 
fundamental that there will always be room for debate over how much lift is enough. 
Despite the uncertainties, of course, defense officials must still decide how to 
allocate resources for lift. Because the future is unclear, military planners would probably 
prefer a larger number of mobility forces to handle any sort of contingency. But acquiring 
enough mobility forces to address all uncertainties would almost certainly be 
unaffordable. 
To examine the costs and capabilities of other investment strategies, CBO 
developed five alternatives to the Administration's plan for strategic mobility. Each was 
designed to meet the needs associated with DoD's current planning scenario: fighting two 
nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. Most of the alternatives would cost 
significantly less than the Administration's plan. Thus, they could free up resources for 
different types of defense spending, for deficit reduction, or for other federal priorities.  
The five alternatives emphasize different modes of lift (see Table 1). Options I 
and II expand pre-positioning beyond what the Administration envisions (afloat and on 
land, respectively), in exchange for fewer C-17s for airlift. Options III and IV focus on 
airlift. Option III uses a different mix of planes than the Administration's plan: fewer C-
17s and more commercial wide-body jets. Option IV adds 20 C-17s to the 
Administration's planned airlift fleet. Option V counts on the use of LMSR vice the C-17, 










  Land-Based  Afloat  
Option Airlift Prepositioning Prepositioning Surge Sealift 
Administra- 120 C-17s Two heavy-brigade  One heavy-brigade 11 LMSRs 
tion's Plan  sets in the Persian Gulf, set and support units  
  one in South Korea on board eight LMSRs  
I 48 fewer C-17s a Same as Administra- One more LMSR 
Same as 
Administra- 
  tion's plan  tion's plan 
II 48 fewer C-17s a Adds 240,000 square Same as Administra- 
Same as 
Administra- 
  feet of prepositioning in tion's plan tion's plan 
  both the Persian Gulf    
  and South Korea   
III 48 fewer C-17s, a Same as Administra- Same as Administra- 
Same as 
Administra- 
 adds 30 C-33s b tion's plan tion's plan tion's plan 
IV 20 more C-17s c Same as Administra-  One fewer LMSR 
Same as 
Administra- 
  tion's plan  tion's plan 
V 48 fewer C-17s a Same as Administra- Same as Administra- One more LMSR
  tion's plan tion's plan  
 
Table 1. Five Alternatives for Modernizing Strategic Mobility. 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
NOTE: LMSR = large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship. 
a. A total of 72 C-17s, or 61 primary aircraft authorized. 
b. A total of 30 C-33s, or 27 primary aircraft authorized. 
c. A total of 140 C-17s, or 119 primary aircraft authorized. 
 
1. Option I 
Under the first alternative, DoD would purchase a total of 72 C-17s rather than 
120. In place of airlift, Option I would substitute one additional LMSR that DoD would 
use to keep a larger amount of equipment prepositioned afloat.  
The Army already plans to preposition much of its heaviest equipment, but it may 
be able to do more. For example, at least half of the weight associated with Army 
aviation units comes from trucks, trailers, and other vehicles that could be stored on an 
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LMSR. Similarly, the Air Force deploys most of its cargo by airlift, including heavy 
equipment for engineering units that could be prepositioned. For Option I, CBO 
identified nearly 260,000 square feet (or 11,400 tons) of equipment that DoD could 
preposition on board an additional LMSR--or roughly 14 percent to 19 percent of the 
total amount that would otherwise be airlifted during the first two to three weeks of a 
major conflict.  CBO chose units that are likely to have high priority for early delivery 
during a major conflict to ensure that prepositioning the equipment would offset airlift 
requirements rather than add to them. [Ref. 1:p. 62] 
Under Option I, the Navy and the Army would face higher costs associated with 
buying one additional ship and another set of equipment. CBO also assumed that the 
average cost of purchasing C-17s would be higher if the Air Force bought just 72 rather 
than 120. Nevertheless, CBO estimates that Option I would cost $18.2 billion less than 
the Administration's plan over the 1998-2020 period. More than $7 billion of those 
savings would accrue by 2002 (see Summary Table 2).  
The Army's current plans involve placing equipment for one heavy brigade, its 
support units, and theater- and corps-level equipment on board eight LMSRs. Those plans 
by no means exhaust the Army's possibilities for prepositioning. For instance, helicopters 
are not suitable for storing on ships because performing routine maintenance on them 
would be difficult. But at least half of the weight of a heavy division's aviation units 
comes from trucks, trailers, and other vehicles that could be placed on an LMSR. 
Likewise, a few critical units that would most likely deploy during the halting phase of a 
major conflict--such as air-defense and artillery units--could be prepositioned.  
Other military services may be able to expand their prepositioning as well. The 
Air Force already prepositions a considerable amount of equipment on land, so it can 
quickly establish air bases in remote or undeveloped regions. Yet other units might also 
be reasonable candidates. For example, Air Force engineering units perform jobs that aid 
the troop deployment, such as creating and augmenting airfields or, as in Bosnia, building 
housing. Because of their numerous trucks, bulldozers, forklifts, cranes, and the like, 
those units weigh a considerable amount, but the Air Force plans to deploy them by air. 
By purchasing additional sets of equipment for engineering units and prepositioning it 
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afloat or on land in the Persian Gulf and Korea, the Air Force might be able to conserve 
on demand for early airlift deliveries. [Ref. 1:p. 64] 
      Total,  Total, 
      1998- 1998- 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002  2020  
C-17s        
   Quantity 8 8 8 0 0 24 24 
   Acquisition costs a 2,473 2,643 2,290 520b 438 b 8,364 8502 
   Operation and support costs c 376 503 597 684 772 2,932 17666 
Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships        
   Quantity 2 2 0 0 0 4 4 
   Acquisition costs 663 d 558 0 0 0 1,220 1220 
   Operation and support costs for ships         
      based in the United States 0 12 25 33 46 116 981 
Costs of Prepositioning Afloat        
   Operation and support costs 110 132 175 197 197 811 4562 
   Cost of buying extra equipment 0 248 124 0 0 372 372 
Costs of Prepositioning in Korea and         
the Persian Gulf        
   Acquisition costs 45 0 0 0 0 45 45 
   Operation and support and        
      military construction costs 85 105 109 112 112 522 2707 
Total Costs 3,750 4,201 3,320 1,547 1,565 14,383 36056 
Savings from the Administration's Plan 76 217 1,019 2,937 2,886 7,134 18,183
 
Table 2. Total Costs Under Option I (In Millions of 1997 Dollars of Budget 
Authority). 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
a. Assumes an annual-procurement strategy rather than a multiyear-procurement strategy. 
b. Includes funding for support equipment, spare parts, and costs associated with shutting down the 
manufacturing line. 
c. Includes operation and support costs for the first 48 C-17s. At a steady-state level, those 48 planes (41 
primary aircraft authorized) would cost approximately $533 million a year (in 1997 dollars) to operate and 
support. 
d. Includes advance procurement funding for two ships in 1999. 
 
2. Option II 
CBO's second alternative is similar to Option I in that DoD would limit its C-17 
purchase to 72 planes. Rather than expanding prepositioning on ships, however, Option II 
would preposition more equipment in warehouses erected both in South Korea and in the 
Persian Gulf region. The services would need to purchase two extra sets of equipment--
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one for each location--so Option II would actually cost slightly more than Option I, even 
though DoD would not buy an additional LMSR. But DoD could tailor the prepositioned 
sets for the scenario at hand, including important equipment, such as that to support a 
Patriot air-defense artillery battalion, that DoD believes does not stand up well to 
prepositioning at sea. [Ref. 1] 
Under Option II, DoD would purchase 24 additional C-17s over the next three 
years, for a total of 72 planes. Instead of buying another LMSR for prepositioning, 
however, DoD would build climate-controlled warehouses in both the Korean and 
Persian Gulf regions, and preposition nearly 240,000 square feet (or about 11,400 tons) of 
equipment at each site. As with Option I, CBO selected equipment for prepositioning that 
is likely to be of high priority in DoD's deployment schedule. That measure helps to 
ensure that the additional prepositioning offsets rather than adds to airlift requirements.  
CBO estimates that the savings associated with a smaller airlift purchase would 
far outweigh the added costs of building warehouses, buying extra equipment, and 
guarding and maintaining it. Net of those costs, Option II would save $16.8 billion 
compared with the Administration's plan over the 1998-2020 period, or $6.4 billion 
through 2002. However, CBO estimates that the cost of building warehouses and buying 
additional equipment would push Option II's price tag about $1.4 billion above Option I's 
through 2020. In all, CBO estimates that Option II would cost $15.1 billion over the 
1998-2002 period or about $37.5 billion between 1998 and 2020 (see Table 3). [Ref 1] 
In order not to underestimate the costs of buying additional equipment, CBO 
included purchases of some major weapon systems, including a Patriot missile battalion 
for each region. (Maintaining the Patriot's sensitive electronics on board ships is difficult, 
so that system was not included among the equipment purchased for Option I.) If DoD 
substituted other units for the more expensive Patriot battalion, Option II might cost $460 
million less over the 1998-2020 period. Given uncertainties about the type of equipment 
that DoD would need to purchase for those two alternatives, readers could consider their 
costs to be roughly comparable.  
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As with Option I, CBO assumed that the Air Force would procure the remaining 
24 C-17s more slowly than current plans allow. That assumption leads to lower total 
acquisition costs in the near term (since DoD would buy fewer aircraft), but a higher 
average cost for each one.  [Ref. 1] 
 
 
      Total,  Total, 
      1998- 1998-
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002  2020  
C-17s        
   Quantity 8 8 8 0 0 24 24 
   Acquisition costs a 2,473 2,643 2,290 520b 438 b 8,364 8,502 
   Operation and support costs c 376 503 597 684 772 2,932 17,666
Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships        
   Quantity 2 1 0 0 0 3 3 
   Acquisition costs 628 d 282 0 0 0 909 909 
   Operation and support costs for ships         
      based in the United States 0 12 25 37 46 120 985 
Costs of Prepositioning Afloat        
(Operation and support) 110 132 175 175 175 768 4,101 
Costs of Prepositioning in Korea and         
Persian Gulf        
   Acquisition costs 245 0 803 401 0 1,449 1,449 
   Operation and support and        
      military construction costs 85 105 109 112 170 580 3,857 
Total Costs 3,915 3,677 3,999 1,930 1,600 15,121 37,470
Savings from the Administration's Plan (89) 741 340 2,554 2,851 6,396 16,768
 
Table 3. Total Costs Under Option II (In Millions of 1997 Dollars of Budget 
Authority). 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
a. Assumes an annual-procurement strategy rather than a multiyear-procurement strategy. 
b. Includes funding for support equipment, spare parts, and costs associated with shutting down the 
manufacturing line. 
c. Includes operation and support costs for the first 48 C-17s. At a steady-state level, those 48 planes (41 
primary aircraft authorized) would cost approximately $533 million a year (in 1997 dollars) to operate and 
supports 






3. Option III 
Under the third alternative, DoD would acquire the same theoretical airlift 
capacity that 120 C-17s provide but with a less expensive mixture of planes:  instead of 
procuring a total of 120 C-17s, Option III would purchase 24 more C-17s (for a total of 
72) plus 30 larger and less expensive commercial wide-body jets (CBO used estimates of 
the cost and capabilities of the C-33, a military version of the Boeing 747-400 freighter, 
for this analysis).  Each C-33 can hold more cargo than a C-17, but the latter can carry a 
wider variety of military equipment because of the larger width and height of its doors 
and cargo hold. Nevertheless, this option would give DoD a comparable level of 
theoretical airlift capacity as the Administration's plan. (Theoretical airlift capacity 
measures the amount that all airlift planes in a fleet could carry when fully mobilized, 
using average measures of each plane's performance. Actual airlift deliveries tend to be 
lower than theoretical capacity.) [Ref. 1] 
As with Options I and II, DoD would purchase its C-17s at a slower pace than 
under the Administration's budget proposal--a maximum of eight per year rather than 15. 
Thus, the average cost of each C-17 would be higher under these alternatives.  
Nevertheless, CBO estimates that total costs for Option III, including purchases of C-17s 
and commercial planes, would be about $4.1 billion in 1998, or $0.3 billion more than the 
Administration's plan in that year (see Table 4).  CBO estimates that Option III would 
cost $8.4 billion less than the Administration's plan over the 1998-2020 period--nearly $4 







      Total,  Total, 
      1998- 1998- 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002  2020  
C-17s        
   Quantity 8 8 8 0 0 24 24 
   Acquisition costs a 2,473 2,643 2,290 520 b 438 b 8,364 8,502 
   Operation and support costs c 376 503 597 684 772 2,932 17,666
C-33s        
   Quantity 1 1 6 6 6 20 30 
   Acquisition costs 429 180 1,025 1,040 1,152 3,827 5,959 
   Operation and support costs 0 0 0 5 48 53 4,932 
Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships        
   Quantity 2 1 0 0 0 3 3 
   Acquisition costs 628 d 282 0 0 0 909 909 
   Operation and support costs for ships         
      Based in the United States 0 12 25 37 46 120 985 
Costs of Prepositioning Afloat         
(Operation and support) 110 132 175 175 175 768 4,101 
Costs of Prepositioning in Korea and the         
Persian Gulf        
   Acquisition costs 45 0 0 0 0 45 45 
   Operation and support and        
      military construction costs 85 105 109 112 112 522 2,707 
Total Costs 4,145 3,857 4,221 2,574 2,743 17,540 45,807
Savings from the Administration's Plan (319) 561 118 1,910 1,708 3,977 8,432 
 
Table 4. Total Costs Under Option III (In Millions of 1997 Dollars of Budget 
Authority). 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
a. Assumes an annual-procurement strategy rather than a multiyear-procurement strategy. 
b. Includes funding for support equipment, spare parts, and costs associated with shutting down the 
manufacturing line. 
c. Includes operation and support costs for the first 48 C-17s. At a steady-state level, those 48 planes (41 
primary aircraft authorized) would cost   approximately $533 million a year (in 1997 dollars) to operate and 
support. 
d. Includes advance procurement funding for two ships in 1999. 
 
4. Option IV 
To demonstrate all of the trade-offs between prepositioning and airlift, Option IV 
is the reverse of Option I:  DoD would rely more heavily on airlift to deliver cargo during 
the halting phase of two major regional contingencies.  Specifically, Option IV would 
buy a total of 140 C-17s.  That size fleet would give DoD about 7 percent more 
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theoretical airlift capacity from its own fleet than under the Administration's plan, 
providing the Air Force with the upper end of its desired range for theoretical airlift 
capacity--nearly 52 MTM/D by 2006.  But the alternative would also scale back 
purchases of LMSRs by one, leaving seven rather than eight ships to house prepositioned 
Army stocks in the Indian Ocean. For that reason, Option IV can be thought of as the 
reverse of Option I, which would add an LMSR for afloat prepositioning and subtract C-
17s.  [Ref. 1] 
CBO assumed that DoD would purchase C-17s at a maximum rate of 15 per year 
under a multiyear-procurement contract, as in the Administration's current plan. Under 
Option IV, DoD would buy its 20 additional planes in 2003 and 2004.  Purchasing 20 
more C-17s than the Administration's plan would lower the average procurement cost of 
each plane.  But airlift is so much more expensive than other modes of lift; the cost of a 
larger number of C-17s would far surpass the savings associated with one fewer LMSR.  
CBO estimates that Option IV's price tag would be $3.8 billion in 1998 and $21.3 billion 
over the 1998-2002 period (see Table 5).  CBO estimates that Option IV would cost 
roughly the same as the Administration's plan between 1998 and 2002, but $6.3 billion 
more than the Administration’s plan through 2020. [Ref. 1]  
5. Option V 
The fifth alternative would once again limit DoD's C-17 purchases to a total of 72, 
but it would buy an additional LMSR that DoD would use in the place of airlift to surge 
cargo from the United States during wartime. Compared with ships prepositioned in the 
Indian Ocean, surge sealift vessels would have a longer distance to travel, so Option V 
would not permit DoD to complete deliveries as quickly as Option I, whose forces are 
identical. But if DoD's assumptions about how much equipment it could deliver quickly 
by airlift and prepositioning are implausible, Option V may be more practical. [Ref. 1] 
Option V is the least costly of the alternatives. CBO estimates that it would save 
$18.9 billion compared with the Administration's plan over the 1998-2020 period and 
$7.5 billion between 1998 and 2002. Through 2020, it would also cost $746 million less 








      Total,  Total,  
      1998- 1998- 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002  2020  
C-17s        
   Quantity 9 13 15 15 15 67 92 
   Acquisition costs  2,584 3,384 3,433 3,440 3,399 16,238 21,865
   Operation and support costs a 376 503 597 725 886 3,086 30,662
Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships        
   Quantity 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 
   Acquisition costs 611 0 0 0 0 611 611 
   Operation and support costs for ships         
      Based in the United States 0 12 25 41 46 124 989 
Costs of Prepositioning Afloat         
(Operation and support) 110 132 154 154 154 702 3,619 
Costs of Prepositioning in Korea and the         
Persian Gulf        
   Acquisition costs 45 0 0 0 0 45 45 
   Operation and support and        
      military construction costs 85 105 109 112 112 522 2,707 
Total Costs 3,809 4,136 4,317 4,471 4,595 21,329 60,497
Savings from the Administration's Plan 17 282 22 13 (145) 189 (6,259)
 
Table 5. Total Costs Under Option IV (In Millions of 1997 Dollars of Budget 
Authority). 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
a. Includes operation and support costs for the first 48 C-17s. At a steady-state level, those 48 planes (41 





















      Total,  Total, 
      1998- 1998- 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002  2020  
C-17s        
   Quantity 8 8 8 0 0 24 24 
   Acquisition costs a 2,473 2,643 2,290 520 b 438 b 8,364 8,502 
   Operation and support costs c 376 503 597 684 772 2,932 17,666
Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships        
   Quantity 2 2 0 0 0 4 4 
   Acquisition costs 663 d 558 0 0 0 1,220 1,220 
   Operation and support costs for ships         
      based in the United States 0 12 25 37 50 124 1,068 
Costs of Prepositioning Afloat         
(Operation and support) 110 132 175 175 175 768 4,101 
Costs of Prepositioning in Korea and the         
Persian Gulf        
   Acquisition costs 45 0 0 0 0 45 45 
   Operation and support and        
      military construction costs 85 105 109 112 112 522 2,707 
Total Costs 3,750 3,953 3,196 1,529 1,547 13,975 35,310
Savings from the Administration's Plan 76 465 1,143 2,955 2,904 7,542 18,929
 
Table 6. Total Costs Under Option V (In Millions of 1997 Dollars of Budget 
Authority). 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
a. Assumes an annual-procurement strategy rather than a multiyear-procurement strategy. 
b. Includes funding for support equipment, spare parts, and costs associated with shutting down the 
manufacturing line. 
c. Includes operation and support costs for the first 48 C-17s. At a steady-state level, those 48 planes (41 
primary aircraft authorized) would cost approximately $533 million a year (in 1997 dollars) to operate and 
support. 
d. Includes advance procurement funding for two ships in 1999. 
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 Administra- Option 
 tions Plan I II III IV V 
Cumulative Costs (In billions of 1997 dollars)       
   1998-2002       
      Total 21.5 14.4 15.1 17.5 21.3 14.0 
      Savings from the Administration's plan n.a. 7.1 6.4 4.0 0.2 7.5 
   1998-2020       
      Total 54.2 36.1 37.5 45.8 60.5 35.3 
      Savings from the Administration's plan n.a. 18.2 16.8 8.4 (6.3) 18.9 
Cumulative Airlift Deliveries to the        
Persian Gulf Plus Sustainment to Korea       
(In thousands of tons) a       
   By day 10 74.6 69.7 69.7 71.8 78.2 69.7 
   By day 15 (plus or minus       
      incremental prepositioning) b 97.5 102.2 102.1 93.3 92.8 90.7 
   By day 20 (plus or minus        
      incremental prepositioning) b 119.9 123.1 123.0 114.6 117.6 111.6 
   Difference from the Administration's plan n.a. 3.1 3.1 (5.3) (2.4) (8.3) 
Outsize Airlift Deliveries to Korea       
(In thousands of tons) c       
   By day 10 13.8 12.8 12.8 13.6 15.9 12.8 
   By day 15 18.0 17.0 17.0 17.8 22.9 17.0 
   By day 20 22.0 20.8 20.8 21.8 27.8 20.8 
   Difference from the Administration's plan n.a. (1.2) (1.2) (0.3) 5.7 (1.2) 
Flexibility to Handle Changes Very Less Least Very Most Flexible 
in Deployment Schedules flexible flexible flexible flexible flexible but slow 
Vulnerability to Enemy Attack Less More Most Less Least More 
 vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable vulnerable 
Risk Associated with Cargo        
Deliveries to Smaller Operations d,e       
   Peacekeeping missions, humanitarian        
      assistance, and evacuations Low Low Low Low Low Low 
   Peace enforcement missions Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Moderate 
Risk Associated with Special Airlift Missions d       
   Strategic brigade airdropse Low High High High Low High 
   Intratheater unit moves Low High High High Low High 
   Direct delivery Low High High High Low High 
 
Table 7. Comparison of the Costs and Capabilities of Alternatives for Modernizing 
Strategic Mobility. 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
NOTE: n.a. = not applicable. 
a. While deploying forces by air to the Persian Gulf, cargo planes would also continue airlift operations on a smaller 
scale to the Korean Peninsula.  The values shown here include airlift deliveries to Korea that would occur at the same 
time as the deployment to a second conflict in the Persian Gulf. They include airlift deliveries for flexible deterrent 
options in the Persian Gulf region. 
b. For two of the alternatives, CBO included deliveries of 11,400 tons of additional equipment prepositioned either 
afloat (Option I) or on land (Option II). For deliveries under Option IV, CBO subtracted 11,400 tons to reflect one 
fewer large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship used for afloat prepositioning. 
c. Includes deliveries for flexible deterrent options. 
d. Risk in this case refers to risk of failing to complete the delivery mission in the required time. 
e. CBO was unable to independently assess the risk associated with these missions. The levels shown are based on 
Defense Department analysis. 
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Each of CBO's five alternatives reflects a unique combination of costs and 
capabilities. How to balance the trade-offs between risk and cost depends on the 
likelihood that the United States will become involved in major or smaller regional 
conflicts, as well as whether U.S. forces will need to perform special airlift missions. 
Ultimately, those are subjective judgments that defense officials and the Congress must 
make.  
Alternatives that include more prepositioned equipment--either on board ships 
(Option I) or in foreign countries (Option II)--would cost less than the Administration's 
plan. Based on CBO's estimates, those savings could be considerable: approximately 
$18.2 billion or $16.8 billion, respectively, over the 1998-2020 period. However, those 
alternatives would require DoD to accept some additional risks. For instance, military 
leaders would need to be sure which units they would dispatch first to major conflicts, 
since rearranging the priority for deploying units would be more difficult. Of course, 
redeploying prepositioned equipment to other regions, if needed, would also take time, 
although Option I would be more flexible in that regard than Option II. Finally, sending 
troops to meet up with prepositioned gear makes deployments more complicated; the 
services would need to conduct more exercises in which personnel practice unloading, 
distributing, and deploying prepositioned sets of equipment. [Ref. 1] 
A key difference between Options I and II is that prepositioning equipment on an 
ally's territory can be more sensitive politically than storing it on board ships that steam 
through international waters or are based at a friendly port, such as Diego Garcia. Thus, 
one hurdle to carrying out Option II would be securing agreements with allied nations to 
host prepositioning sites. Although such agreements have not been difficult to obtain with 
South Korea, there have been more sensitivities in placing U.S. equipment in Saudi 
Arabia and other parts of the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, even if the United States 
obtained approval to expand prepositioning in a region, those political sensitivities might 
continue to limit how and when the equipment was used. [Ref. 1] 
However, one benefit of prepositioning equipment on land rather than afloat is 
that it can be tailored to the scenario at hand. For example, prepositioning sites in the 
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Persian Gulf would most likely include larger numbers of heavy-equipment transports or 
desalination units than equipment sets in South Korea.  
Alternatives that substitute more sealift ships for airlift--either as a platform on 
which to preposition equipment (Option I) or to surge cargo from the United States 
(Option V)--also introduce some risks. Since each LMSR carries such a large 
concentration of cargo, mines or attacks on harbors could cause greater delays in 
deliveries than if one or two airfields were closed. Deliveries might also be delayed if 
U.S. ships were unable to transit key choke points such as the Suez Canal or the Strait of 
Hormuz. [Ref. 1] 
Yet despite those risks, LMSRs provide considerable delivery capacity at 
relatively low cost. For example, even if DoD purchased a total of 140 C-17s (as in 
Option IV), the addition of 20 planes beyond the Administration's planned level could not 
offset one fewer LMSR prepositioned in the Indian Ocean. Thus, according to CBO's 
estimates, Option IV could not deliver as much cargo to two major regional conflicts 
during the crucial halting phase.  [Ref. 1] 
Option III would give DoD some of the advantages of airlift, such as more 
flexibility to adjust deployment schedules to changing circumstances, at a savings of $8.4 
billion over the 1998-2020 periods. But like Options I, II, and V, Option III would not 
include enough C-17s to perform certain types of special airlift missions, such as strategic 
airdrops of brigades or intratheater cargo deliveries.  [Ref. 1] 
Although they cost the most, alternatives that include the largest numbers of C-
17s (such as the Administration's plan and Option IV) have some distinct advantages. 
They would permit the Air Force to conduct a wider range of smaller deployments or 
special airlift missions with more confidence. And military commanders would have 
more flexibility to rearrange the order in which they deploy units to a major regional 
contingency. But whether those advantages are worth the considerable cost of the C-17 
depends on whether decision makers believe that DoD is likely to need to perform those 
tasks or to require the flexibility of 120 C-17s in the years ahead.  
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Based on DoD's analysis, then, alternatives that include just 72 C-17s (Options I, 
II, III, and V) might not be adequate to conduct special missions like strategic brigade 
airdrops and intratheater deliveries. However, airlift is the most costly mode of lift, and 
the C-17, although a very capable plane, is also quite expensive. Thus, the Congress may 
want to balance the cost of larger numbers of C-17s against the likelihood that the United 
States will need to perform the types of special airlift missions for which they are 
necessary. [Ref. 1] 
H. CONCLUSION  
This chapter examined the force structure of the air mobility force and identified 
several challenges if it is to achieve the objectives set by the National Security Strategy.  
The current force structure falls short of the targeted strategic environment that it sought 
to fulfill.  In addition, the current force structure is incongruent with the vast diversity of 
requirements in today’s strategic environment, which range from coercive military 
operations to humanitarian operations. 
The problem the air mobility force faces is not the capability of the new core 
airlifter, but instead the relatively small number of operational C-17s that replace the C-
141s.  Our inability to meet peak demands along the deployment timeline presents a 
significant deficiency in moving volume at crucial time in the contingency.  The 
capability lines of today’s fleet and the fleet of the future are linear because they 
represent the fixed number of airframes operating at the wartime surge rate. 
Two points have to be addressed when logistical supply is not meeting the war 
fighter’s demand in contingency operations.  Our forces will suffer losses while they wait 
for the equipment and supplies they need to fight and win.  Even more importantly, the 
war can be over with if we can’t deploy to the theater quickly and ready to fight.  Airlift 
provides the crucial, rapid response we require to position forces to fight.  For each 
MTM/D we shortfall we compromise our ability to meet the requirements for our NSS; 
we place our people and the successful outcome of the contingency at risk.  The next 
chapter will discuss how the Army plans to set it goals and transform to support 
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IV. THE ARMY’S TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN 
A. VISION 
The spectrum of 21st century operations demands land forces in joint, 
multinational, and interagency formations for a variety of missions extending from 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and 
winning major theater wars--our non-negotiable contract with the American people. In 
October 1999, senior Army leaders announced a new Vision to enable the Army to better 
meet these diverse, complex demands. The Vision's goal is to ensure that the Army 
fulfills its responsibilities in meeting the NMS. To do this, the Army must transform itself 
into a full spectrum force more capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of 
operations. The Objective Force resulting from the Vision will meet the challenges of the 
21st century by providing the Nation with an Army that is more responsive, deployable, 
agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. [Ref. 12] 
These characteristics of the Objective Force are complementary features that 
together produce an overall capability greater than the individual capabilities they 
describe. The characteristics arise from the Vision's goal and the likely shape of the 
future international security environment. In turn, they provide the analytical foundation 
for developing the concepts, doctrine, and systems that will constitute the Objective 
Force.  
The Objective Force must be responsive to allow the Army to meet frequent 
contingency requirements with any element of the force. To be responsive requires the 
ability to put forces where needed on the ground, supported by air and naval forces, to 
directly affect the outcome of the situation or crisis at hand within hours of a decision. 
The forces deployed must be prepared to accomplish their mission regardless of the 
environment, the nature or scope of the proposed operation, or other commitments. They 
should have a demonstrated capability to deter the prudent adversary, as well as to 
influence and shape the outcome of the crisis. If required, they should have the ability to 
employ force from low to high-intensity.  Responsiveness applies to more than just 
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operational forces; the entire mobilization process must be responsive to ensure the entire 
force is available in a timely manner.  
To achieve this responsiveness, Objective Force units must be deployable. These 
units must be capable of rapid strategic movement to create the opportunity to avert 
conflict through deterrence and confront potential adversaries before they can achieve 
their goals. The Objective Force requirement is to have a combat brigade on the ground 
within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 
days. Within a theater of operations, Army forces must be able to reposition rapidly to 
create and exploit advantage. The Army must reduce the size of its systems to attain the 
desired level of strategic and intra-theater deployability. [Ref. 13] 
Because of the broad range of missions that will be assigned to U.S. forces, often 
in highly volatile situations, Army forces must be able to shift intensity of operations 
without augmentation, a break in contact, or additional training. Today's forces possess 
the agility to shift seamlessly from offensive to defensive to offensive operations on the 
battlefield. The Objective Force must replicate that same agility in a much broader, full 
spectrum context within entire theaters of operation. These forces will frequently be 
called upon to transition from non-combat disaster relief to low-intensity contingencies to 
high-intensity warfighting with little or no time to change mindset or organizational 
design. The ability to make these transitions in an agile manner without losing 
momentum is a function of our people. The Army will develop it through leadership and 
training.  [Ref. 13] 
Versatility is closely related to agility, but is a function of force organization and 
equipment. The elements of the Objective Force must be adaptive to changing situations 
and must have utility across the spectrum. These characteristics will allow the Army to 
respond when needed and rotate forces in and out to relieve OPTEMPO and 
PERSTEMPO. The frequency and duration of small-scale contingency (SSC) operations 
leave neither the time nor the forces for overly specialized units or extensive 
reorganization and preparation for specific missions. The Army cannot sustain the 
operational and personnel tempo of the broad range of crisis response SSC operations and 
sustained commitments with only part of its force. Therefore, the Army must have the 
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ability to commit all of the force in its turn, regardless of component, to meet operational 
demands, even if those demands are for distinct operations in different areas of the world. 
All Army forces must have the built-in organizational flexibility to respond.  
An overwhelming ability to win through application of lethal force can frequently 
preclude conflict by making the adversary's potential losses disproportionate to his 
objectives. Lethality must be embedded in every force and unit. They must all have the 
ability to transition from peace to war and access joint capabilities easily without a break 
in momentum. Even in a seemingly benign environment, our forces cannot ignore the 
possibility of a chance encounter with hostile elements, whether because of a sudden, 
unforeseen change in the situation or from radical factions determined to undermine the 
peace. The consequences of the inability to apply appropriate lethal effects are not just 
unnecessary loss of life, but could include significant political and operational changes in 
the environment. Furthermore, lethality signals to our adversaries the potential 
consequences to them of their willingness to escalate the conflict.  
As the forces continue to operate in harm's way, it is crucial to their confidence 
that we take all possible measures to protect the force and ensure its survival. 
Survivability also affects the perceptions of our adversaries about their ability to fight and 
win against U.S. forces. But the survivability of the Objective Force must extend beyond 
combat operations across the full spectrum of operations, and it must address current and 
emerging asymmetric capabilities. To meet these challenges, the Army must have 
modern equipment that incorporates new technologies to meet mission requirements, 
counter emerging threat capabilities, and reduce the risks of fratricide.  
Our Army forces must retain the capability to continue operations longer than any 
adversary we confront. This is a critical aspect of equipment superiority.  Sustainability is 
directly linked to responsiveness and deployability. Careful planning and discipline is 
essential to deploy only those forces and systems needed to ensure dominance at every 
point on the spectrum of operations.  Sustainment requirements will be reduced, where 
possible, by minimizing forces deployed into the area of operations through split basing 
and the use of technology to provide reach-back capability. Host nation and allied support 
for our forces can also reduce sustainment requirements, but the Army must be able to 
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operate unilaterally if necessary. Consequently we must continue to find ways to exploit 
advanced technologies and reduce the logistics footprint and related costs of our support 
structure.  
As it transforms itself into the Objective Force with the characteristics described 
above, the Army will remain a values-based force that derives its greatness from its 
people. The Army will continue to attract, train, motivate, and retain the most competent 
and dedicated people in the Nation to fuel our ability to be persuasive in peace and 
invincible in war. The Army will invest in training, educating, and equipping our soldiers 
while providing them and their families with the well being necessary to make the Army 
a rewarding and fulfilling profession. Providing our soldiers and leaders with a strong 
physical, mental, and moral foundation will enable them to act decisively while 
conducting full spectrum operations in the complex environments they will surely face. 
[Ref. 12] 
B. THE ARMY’S TRANSFORMATION 
At present, although the Army is capable of full spectrum dominance, its 
organization and force structure are not optimized for strategic responsiveness.  Army 
options available to warfighting CINCs for joint contingency response are too limited.  
Army light forces can deploy quite rapidly—within a matter of days—but they lack the 
lethality, mobility, and staying power necessary to assure decisive action.  On the other 
hand, Army mechanized forces possess substantial lethality and staying power, but they 
require too much time to deploy, given current joint capabilities for strategic lift, 
affording the adversary too much time to prepare for the arrival of US forces. Typically, 
each mission requires deploying an augmented corps- or division-level headquarters 
commanding a mission-tailored force.  Experience indicates that it normally takes as 
much or more time to construct and deploy the headquarters element as it does to deploy 
the tactical formations.  As a result, today’s joint contingency responses typically follow 
a sequential deployment pattern that requires considerable time and effort to build up 
military power sufficient and flexible enough to deter aggression, contain the crisis, 
and/or shape the battlespace and achieve decision.[Ref. 13] 
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Today’s Army—the Legacy Force—consists of both heavy and light forces.  It 
contains strategically agile light forces that can deploy very rapidly but lack the necessary 
mobility, lethality and survivability to oppose the full range of potential enemy 
capabilities once deployed.  Conversely, its heavy forces possess unmatched lethality, 
survivability, tactical mobility and endurance, but require too much and too many assets 
to deploy quickly given current joint capabilities for strategic lift. 
Constraints on lift apportioned to ground forces introduce delays in the build-up 
of a synchronized joint force.  These constraints often lead to the initial introduction of 
ground force packages that lack deterrent credibility because they are unable to 
immediately conduct multidimensional operations.  Prepositioned war stocks reduce 
strategic lift requirements, but only in the specific regions where those stocks are stored 
or can be quickly inserted.  Consequently, today’s limited strategic lift capability causes 
U.S. military responses to follow predictably sequential deployment patterns to build 
sufficient military power to contain, shape and achieve decision.  This reduces the 
deterrent effect of U.S. forces in regional conflicts.  Transforming the Army into a 
lighter, more deployable force will partially address these issues, but must be 
complemented by a comprehensive program to improve joint strategic lift capabilities for 
both the Legacy Force and future forces. 
C. OBJECTIVE FORCE DEVELOPMENT 
The Objective Force will be designed to provide decisive combat power to 
dominant land operations in future joint contingencies.  It will be a strategically 
responsive, general-purpose force that participates in all phases of the joint campaign, in 
all environments, weather, and terrain.  The force will incorporate revolutionary change 
embodied in advanced C4ISR capabilities; Future Combat Systems (FCS); future 
reconnaissance, lift, and attack aircraft; and the products of the revolution in military 
logistics.  Capabilities are derived from concepts in the force development process.  The 
Army builds capabilities and forces around soldiers to fully exploit and sustain human 
dimensions of warfare rather than building platforms that are simply enabled by soldiers.  
Army forces do not fight platforms; they fight soldiers led by capable leaders, organized 
into effective units, and enabled by advanced capabilities to create overmatching combat 
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power.  As the capabilities are derived, the Army will devote comprehensive efforts to 
insure that its soldiers are trained, educated and equipped to meet the requirements of 
future conflicts. [Ref. 13] 
The degree to which the Objective Force fully embodies the characteristics 
outlined in the Army’s Vision--responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable 
and sustainable—will determine to a significant degree the overall capability of the force 
to carry out its core operational tasks within the joint campaign. 
A responsive and deployable Objective Force empowers joint commanders with 
broader options, frustrates enemy timelines, cements the coalition early by its 
representation of national resolve and provides the capability to assure the outcome of 
timeline and conditions.  Responsiveness and deployability will be achieved through 
lighter formations, reductions in deployment tonnages, improved military and civilian 
force projection platforms, advanced en route planning/rehearsal tools, and simplification 
and reduction of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration requirements.  
Responsiveness is also improved through force design and organizational principles—
modularity, force pooling, general purpose design---that permit the commander to rapidly 
tailor and deploy the appropriate force for each contingency and to transition to other 
forms of operations when battlefield conditions change. 
Effective joint operations place a premium on agility and versatility.  The 
versatility of the Objective Force will provide the Joint Commanders with general-
purpose utilities and dominance across entire spectrums of operations.  Agility and 
versatility will enable the transition between benign and hostile environments, within and 
between operations, including the transition from stability and support operations to 
higher intensity offensive and defensive operations.  Mental and physical agility supports 
transitions across the mission sets and enables the force to dominate all environments, 
threats, and terrains, enhancing operational flexibility through multifunctional application 
within the force. [Ref. 13] 
Lethality is the sum of actions that will be taken to close with or destroy the 
enemy.  The Objective Force will have to be able to deliver overmatching combat power 
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with integrated combined arms and capability at the lowest levels of the organizational 
design.  Central to this capability is using decisive fires, maneuvers, and assault to assure 
complete destruction of the enemy.  At the tactical level, the close combat zone will 
expand in size and focus toward fighting and winning beyond line of sight engagements.  
The freedom of maneuvers for lethal units will be provided through mobile/survivable 
systems and units. 
Survivability will be achieved holistically through force shielding, a system of 
systems approach that integrates physical capabilities for survivability with the manner in 
which the force is employed.  In the past, the Army built systems capable of surviving 
direct-fire hits.  In contrast, survivability requires effectively integrating active and 
passive means of protection, combined with advanced situational understandings, mutual 
interaction between platforms and dismounted soldiers, greater stand-off ranges, 
improved avoidance and penetration protection. 
The Objective Force will achieve sustainability by investing in the technologies 
and enablers that support focused logistics and that will truly revolutionize military 
logistics.  Units of the Objective Force will sustain multiple operations through ultra-
reliable systems, systems commonality, revolutionary power generation, higher fuel 
efficiency, and improved system maintainability.  Sharply reduced sustainment demands, 
particularly for water, fuels and munitions, will reduce throughput and infrastructure 
requirements.  As these changes are implemented, the Objective Force will retain the 
infrastructure and capabilities required to sustain and support the joint force in 
accordance with the Army’s mandated joint responsibilities. 
D. INTERIM FORCE 
The Army's responsibility to satisfy 21st Century requirements for effective full 
spectrum strategic responsiveness demands an improved capability for the rapid 
deployment of highly-integrated, combined arms forces possessing overmatching 
capabilities, exploiting the power of information and human potential, and combining the 
advantages of both light and mechanized forces, across the full range of military 
operations.  Meeting this requirement and providing warfighting CINCs with an 
important new option for contingency response is the central near-term objective of the 
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Army's decision to develop full spectrum medium weight brigades, known as the Interim 
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). [Ref. 14] 
Creating a limited number of reorganized IBCTs will add near term capability for 
strategic responsiveness, particularly regarding the Army’s frequent participation in 
small-scale contingencies.  The new IBCTs complement other existing forces to provide 
a full spectrum capable Army today, while the Army simultaneously builds the entire 
(mid-term) Interim Force and pursues Transformation to the longer-term Objective Force 
described in the Combat Support Activity (CSA) Vision.  To be more precise, the IBCTs, 
operating within division structures, will provide a complementary capability to our 
current light and mechanized forces, serving as a bridging force and vanguard until 
science and technology allow the Army to achieve Objective Force capabilities.  The 
IBCT will give the Army a quick-strike capability until it fields the first units of its 
Future Combat System in 2012.  The remnants of the legacy force, along with the IBCT 
and multiplatform Future Combat System, will compromise the Army’s future fighting 
force, the Objective Force. [Ref. 14] 
The Army will rapidly and nearly simultaneously develop two initial Brigade 
Combat Teams during CYs 00 and 01 on the basis of two existing brigades, one heavy 
and one light, at Fort Lewis, Washington.  Near simultaneous development will reduce 
costs, double the emerging capability for improved strategic responsiveness represented 
by the initial Brigade Combat Teams, and create an environment wherein parallel efforts 
based on differing organizations can inform and expedite the overall development 
process.  Efforts to create the two initial Brigade Combat Teams will also occur in 
parallel with plans to generate subsequent IBCTs for the Interim Force.  As a result of 
their accelerated development, the initial Brigade Combat Teams will also function to 
jump-start immediate forward progress in implementing the Army Transformation 
Strategy, without compromising the Army’s ability to accomplish its most fundamental 
mission—fighting and winning the nation’s wars. [Ref. 15] 
E. MISSION OF INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 
The Interim Brigade Combat Team is a full spectrum, combat force.  It has utility, 
confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environments against all 
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projected future threats, but it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in 
small scale contingencies (SSC) in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and 
mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities.   Fully 
integrated within the joint contingency force, the IBCT deploys very rapidly, executes 
early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, 
contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations.  The 
IBCT participates in a major theater war (MTW) as a subordinate maneuver component 
within a division or corps, in a variety of possible roles.  The IBCT also participates in 
stability and support operations (SASO) as an initial entry force and/or as a guarantor to 
provide security for stability forces by means of its extensive combat capabilities. [Ref. 
14] 
F. INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM OVERVIEW 
The IBCT is a divisional brigade.  It is designed to optimize its organizational 
effectiveness and balance the traditional domains of lethality, mobility and survivability, 
with the capabilities required for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability and a 
reduced in-theater footprint.  Its core qualities are high mobility (strategic, operational, 
and tactical) and its ability to achieve decisive action through dismounted infantry 
assault, supported by organic direct and indirect fire platforms, and enabled by situational 
understanding.  The major fighting components are its motorized infantry battalions.  The 
IBCT also has a unique Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) 
Squadron to enhance situational understanding. 
As noted in the mission statement, the Interim Brigade Combat Team is 
specifically designed an early entry combat force.  Its likely operational environment 
includes a number of distinguishing features: urban/complex terrain; a weak 
transportation and logistical infrastructure, uncertain political situation; coalition 
involvement; and, the presence of an asymmetric threat including mostly mid- but some 
high-end technologies.  To achieve a very rapid deployment threshold, the Brigade’s 
design capitalizes on the widespread use of common vehicular platforms, particularly a 
highly mobile, medium-weight armored combat/combat support platform, coupled with a 
minimized personnel and logistical footprint in theater.  Pre-configured in ready-to-fight 
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combined arms packages, the entire IBCT can deploy within 96 hours of “first aircraft 
wheels up” and begin operations immediately upon arrival at the aerial port of 
debarkation (APOD).  In essence, the APOD is the tactical assembly area (TAA).  The 
IBCT cannot conduct forced entry, but can provide the joint force commander an 
improved capability to arrive immediately behind forced entry forces and begin 
operations to shape the battlespace and expedite decision.  Once committed, the IBCT 
can sustain operations for up to 180 days without relief. 
IBCT organization is expandable through either augmentation or scalability in 
accordance with the mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time, and civilians in any given 
contingency.  The IBCT is scaleable in terms of its ability to accept like-type additional 
forces to expand core tasks and functions already resident within the IBCT (e.g., adding 
additional infantry or RSTA organizations).  The IBCT is also capable of accepting 
augmentation, including units or elements that execute tasks or functions not resident 
within the Brigade (e.g., adding armor, field artillery, air defense, additional engineers, 
military police, or aviation elements). In both cases, added units will execute their normal 
mission essential tasks and therefore will not require extensive training in order to deploy 
and operate with the IBCT.  The organization includes the command, control, and 
communications (C3) “hooks” necessary to permit rapid integration of additional, 
enabling capabilities, particularly for operations outside the scope of SSCs, such as 
SASO and major theater war.  
Operationally, the Interim Brigade Combat Team normally fights under a 
division.  The IBCT can also fight under the direct control of a corps headquarters within 
a joint or combined command.  In either case, if the employing HQ is not already in 
place, it must deploy lead elements of its command, control, and communications 
structure in order to establish the C3 framework required for effective initial operations.  
In many contingencies, the IBCT will (initially) be the single US maneuver command 
operating under the Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC).  The IBCT 
depends upon the division and higher echelons of command for reach-back linkages to 
expand its capabilities in information, intelligence, joint effects, force protection and 
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sustainment.  The IBCT is also fully complementary to and compatible with air 
expeditionary forces and USMC forces with respect to integrated employment. [Ref. 15] 
As a full spectrum combat force, the IBCT typically maintains an offensive 
orientation.  However, depending on the nature and evolution of the contingency, it is 
capable of conducting all major doctrinal operations, including offensive, defensive, 
stability, and support operations.  Its core operational capabilities rest upon excellent 
operational and tactical mobility, enhanced situational understanding, combined arms 
integration down to the company level, and high infantry dismount strengths for close 
combat in urban and complex terrain.  Properly integrated, these core capabilities 
compensate for platform limitations that may exist in the close fight and enhance force 
effectiveness.  The IBCT also reinforces force effectiveness through teaming at all 
echelons and a high level of training based on a Train-Alert-Deploy framework.  When 
employed in the operational environment for which it is optimized, the IBCT has the 
capability to achieve early decision as a result of its rapid response, shaping, and decisive 
operations. [Ref. 13] 
G. STRATEGIC MOBILITY 
The Army has designed its own set of goals for deploying forces rapidly to 
regional conflicts. That plan assumes that the United States will have fewer forces abroad 
in the future than it did during the Cold War. The Army's focus is preparing a five-
division contingency corps (with one airborne, two heavy, one air assault, and one light 
division) that would deploy on short notice and is capable of using force immediately 
upon entering a region. [Ref. 1] 
Under the Army's plan, the contingency corps would face a tight delivery 
schedule: a ready brigade from a light division would arrive in the region of conflict four 
days after the start of deployments (C+4), with most of the rest of the division following 
by C+12. [Ref 1: p 66] One heavy brigade would be delivered by C+15 under the plan, 
with two reinforcing divisions (one armored plus either one mechanized or one air 
assault) arriving by C+30. The full five-division contingency corps plus a corps-support 
command would be in place by C+75. [Ref. 1:p. 66]  That schedule serves as a rough 
guideline: the precise timing for deliveries would vary depending on the scenario at hand. 
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In the case of a conflict in the Persian Gulf, for example, the Army has set an even 
tougher timeline--it plans to have an entire heavy division in place within the first two 
weeks of deployments. Given competing demands for transportation at the start of a 
conflict, there would not be enough planes to deliver even a heavy brigade that quickly 
by airlift alone. For that reason, the Army is prepositioning heavy equipment and some 
support units in the Gulf region. [Ref. 1] 
To give a sense of the scope of the Army's mobility requirements, Table 8 shows 
the average number of airlift sorties or shiploads required to transport parts of a notional 
contingency corps. For example, an airborne division would need 1,101 C-141 and 78 C-
17 sorties--or nearly three large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off shiploads--to move its 
equipment and accompanying supplies. [Ref.13] (All units would require some C-17s or 
C-5s to move their outsize cargo, but the remaining equipment could be flown on C-
141s.) Although Table 8 shows information for a notional corps-support command, it 
does not reflect all the corps-level units and support units for echelons above corps that 
would deploy, such as air defense, artillery, some headquarters units and additional 
aviation brigades. Thus, lift requirements for an entire corps would be much larger than 
the sum of the units shown. [Ref. 1] 
 Number of Unit Weight Airlift Sorties Number 
Notional Army Unit Personnel (Tons) (C-141/C-17 mix) a of LMSRs b 
Airborne Division 13,242 26,699 1,101/78 2.8 
Air Assault Division 15,840 35,860 1,412/195 3.9 
Armored Division 17,756 110,431 1,761/1,274 6.2 
Mechanized Division 17,982 109,116 1,708/1,275 6.2 
Light Infantry Division 11,036 17,092 769/41 1.8 
Corps-Support Command 22,410 98,717 3,599/500 8.5 
 
Table 8. Approximate Lift Requirements for Army Contingency Forces. 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense, Military Traffic Management 
Command, Deployment Planning Guide, 94-700-5 (Newport News, Va., September 1994). 
NOTE: Based on data from the Army's April 1994 Tables of Organization and Equipment. Actual 
deployment values will be different for specific units and scenarios. Estimated weights include 
accompanying supplies, equipment, and ammunition. 
a. The number of C-141 and C-17 sorties required to move each unit's equipment based on simulations of 
aircraft loading. Although the sorties shown would move some of the unit's personnel, additional passenger 
sorties by Civil Reserve Air Fleet planes would be necessary. 
b. The number of large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships required to transport each unit, assuming 
minimum containerization of unit equipment. 
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For major conflicts, the Army's need for strategic mobility surpasses that of the 
other military services. That requirement appears to hold true both in the early stages of a 
conflict and over an entire deployment.  
Consider the Persian Gulf War, for example. During August 1990, the Army 
accounted for about 43 percent (by weight) of all the equipment for early-deploying units 
that was sent by airlift, fast sealift, and prepositioning ships. The Marine Corps was 
responsible for the next largest share, about 35 percent, primarily because its Maritime 
Prepositioning Ships arrived on the scene early. Air Force cargo, which moved almost 
entirely by airlift, accounted for almost all of the remaining 22 percent. [Ref. 1] 
For a major conflict in the future, defense planners believe that Army forces will 
constitute about 77 percent of DoD's total workload for strategic mobility forces. The 
Army's share of the mobility workload would be somewhat lower in the early part of a 
deployment, when Air Force and Marine Corps units were moving quickly to the theater. 
But the Army requires a large number of combat-support and combat-service-support 
units, many of which would deploy later in a contingency (Figure 4).  
The Army wants the IBCT to include some of the firepower of its heavy legacy 
forces, like Abrams tanks, and the speed of its airborne troops or light forces.  The 
service’s heavy forces currently take up to 30 days to get to battle by ship.  The Air Force 
would have to use three aircraft to move the IBCT, including C-130Js for in-theater 
missions, and the C-5 and C-17 aircrafts for long distance transport. To move an IBCT 
brigade of 360 armored vehicles, 1,183 C-130J sorties are required.  Studies are currently 
underway to determine what combination of C-5s, C-17s and C-130s will be required to 
move one IBCT into combat. [Ref. 14] 
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In order to describe how a major military deployment takes place, it is important to understand a few basic 
terms about military forces. 
Army Divisions and Brigades. U.S. Army forces are organized into units of various sizes. Larger-size 
units include brigades, divisions, and corps. Brigades usually consist of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers from two to 
five smaller units (called battalions). Divisions are typically composed of three brigades plus additional 
units in charge of command and control, field artillery, engineering, aviation support, air defenses, and the 
like. An Army unit that is fully capable of synchronizing and sustaining combat operations is called a 
corps. Corps typically includes two or more divisions plus additional units that help to command combat 
forces and provide logistical support. In a major conflict, the Army might also deploy echelons above 
corps—additional units that conduct activities such as providing ballistic missile defenses for all U.S. 
troops in a theater. 
Light and Heavy Units. Army units are described as heavy or light depending on how many tanks, 
armored vehicles, and other pieces of heavy equipment they include.  Armored and mechanized divisions 
are examples of heavy units. Airborne and light infantry units are designed to be light enough to be 
transported by air.  
Combat Arms, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support. The Army refers to those units that 
would be directly involved in fighting a conflict as combat arms. Armored, infantry, and attack-helicopter 
units are some examples. Forces that provide operational assistance to combat arms are known as combat-
support units. They include military intelligence; military police; chemical, engineering, and signal forces; 
and some aviation units. Combat-service-support units perform logistics and administrative functions such 
as those of quartermasters, transportation specialists, and medical professionals.  
Air Force Wings. U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft are organized into wings of approximately 72 planes, 
with most wings composed of just one type of plane. 
Marine Expeditionary Forces. The U.S. Marine Corps is organized into task forces of various sizes, each 
of which includes both ground and air elements. The largest of those units is the Marine expeditionary 
force (MEF). The lead elements of a MEF are designated as a MEF (Forward) a reinforced infantry 
regiment supported by a Marine air group. 
Navy Forces. U.S. Navy ships are organized into task forces of various sizes as the occasion demands. In 
general, Navy forces tend to carry their own combat equipment, personnel, and logistical support. As a 
result, the Navy requires relatively little support from mobility forces for moving dry cargo. 
 
Figure 4. Types of Military Forces: A Summary. 
 
Since airlift is the most costly mode of transportation, how much of it each 
service requires is important. During the first month of the Persian Gulf War, Army units 
(troops and equipment) accounted for some 46 percent, by weight, of all airlift deliveries. 
The Air Force required about a quarter of early airlift deliveries to set up aerial port 
operations, establish bases from which to operate aircraft and deploy tactical fighter 
wings. Likewise, the Department of the Navy (which includes Marine forces) accounted 
for another quarter of airlift deliveries in August 1990. Over the entire Gulf War 
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deployment, Army equipment made up the largest share of airlift deliveries, followed by 
Air Force and then Marine Corps cargo. [Ref. 1] 
Because the Army represents the bulk of what the United States would deploy to a 
major contingency, the physical characteristics of Army equipment--its shape and 
weight--are critical factors for mobility planning. Over time, the weight and square 
footage of Army units have grown significantly as the service has modernized and 
reorganized its forces. In 1994, for example, a mechanized division was about 49 percent 
heavier and took up 17 percent more floor space than the same type of division structured 
under 1987 guidelines. On average, most types of Army units have grown in square 
footage by at least 2 percent a year since 1987 and grown in weight by more than 4 
percent a year. [Ref. 1] 
The Army's larger "footprint" reflects the fact that some of today's equipment is 
more capable and better able to survive enemy forces. But the larger weight of Army 
units unquestionably poses a bigger burden for mobility forces. Recognizing that burden, 
many mobility experts have urged designers to pay more attention to a weapon system's 
"transportability" when designing new equipment.  
H. AIRLIFT COULD BE NEEDED FOR SPECIAL MISSIONS  
Because of the cost of airlift, DoD’s major planning scenarios anticipate that most 
equipment for a conflict would already be prepositioned or would arrive by sealift.  
However, airlift would be more effective. One reason is that transport planes can deliver 
cargo to locations that do not have access to ports or railroads. Also, for lighter forces, 
airlift planes deliver equipment much more quickly than can sealift ships. Moreover, 
airlift is a quick means of delivering cargo to missions such as humanitarian relief 
operations or transporting military equipment to U.S. forces deployed abroad. But 
another reason is that some transport aircraft perform special military missions that some 
defense officials consider important. Whether the United States is willing to pay the 
higher cost for those capabilities is subject to debate. [Ref. 2] 
Probably the most notable special mission is large-scale, intercontinental airdrop 
operations. The Army is required to be able to insert brigade-size forces quickly into any 
region of the world--even countries that are beyond the range of most cargo planes 
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without refueling. During such a mission, airlift planes would drop troops and their 
equipment by parachute; the troops would then seize control of an airfield and prepare it 
to receive reinforcements quickly. Since the initial forces would be deploying into hostile 
territory, military planners set very tight timelines for airdrops. But the United States has 
used airdrop operations sparingly in the past, especially when paratroopers would need to 
deploy over long distances; the last time DoD dropped a brigade-size force outside the 
Western Hemisphere was during the Vietnam War. [Ref. 2] 
Nevertheless, the Army's requirement to prepare for long-range, large-scale 
airdrops is a key factor in DoD's plans for procuring airlift planes. Only a few types of 
military transports can be used to drop parachutists. For regions that are closer to the 
United States, airlift planes could conduct an initial airdrop and then return to the United 
States to pick up additional loads. For longer-range deployments, however, DoD would 
need larger numbers of strategic airlift planes to conduct an airdrop and also complete 
deliveries within the demanding timelines laid out by military planners.  
I. CONCLUSION 
The development of an Interim Brigade Combat Team will make immediate 
improvements in the strategic responsiveness of Army ground forces.  The IBCTs will 
enhance the ability of joint force commanders to respond to opportunity and uncertainty.   
Equally, the development of the IBCTs will represent a clear near term improvement in 
national and theater conventional deterrence, providing national command authorities the 
capability to place a credible, visible, and flexible combat force on the ground anywhere 
in the world within 96 hours. 
Improving the Army’s future strategic responsiveness is a greater challenge due to 
the difficulties involved in accurately predicting future threats and the clear requirements 
for ever more linked and integrated joint requirements.  The greatest value the Army’s 
Objective Force concept could provide is its role in forcing rapid resolution and detailed 
definition of future joint fighting concepts and requirements.  The danger of proceeding 
with Objective Force requirements is that the Army could develop the wrong Objective 
Force and meet the Army’s requirement, but not be able to meet the requirements that 
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require other joint forces in assuring that the troops and equipment are able to get to the 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The following are specific conclusions that have been drawn from this study: 
1. The air mobility capabilities are insufficient to support AMC’s 
requirements and a steady-state operational requirement. 
This study found that the current force structure does not support the requirements 
that are imposed by the MRS BURU, nor can the transformation of the Army’s Objective 
Force, be supported by the number of airlifters in the force today.  
In addition to the MTM/D estimates that indicate a shortage of strategic airlift, 
time phased force deployment data has also shown that our requirements supersede 
current and future capabilities.  The inability to meet timeline requirements and to handle 
peak demands within deployment and sustainment operations is clearly a problem posed 
by the time-phased deployment.  A likely alternative to minimize airlift requirements is to 
reduce overall airlift deployment/sustainment operations by using fast sealift or 
prepositioning. 
2.       The inadequacy of AMC’s current force structure and the C-17 
acquisition program is likely to decrease the shortfalls identified. 
A sufficient number of new airframes replace the older airframes that are being 
retired. The numbers that are being identified for the C-17 will face insurmountable 
challenges in attempting to satisfy the requirements of steady-state operations. 
U.S. strategic airlift forces are modernizing to meet current and future airlift 
challenges.  The C-17 is the crucial link to the change in capabilities.  The problem lies in 
the number of C-17s that will ultimately be produced to meet the national military 
requirement.   The current production cap of 120 C-17s is not based on requirements; it is 
based on budgetary constraints.  As our forces evolve around constrained budgets, 
matching capabilities with the National Security Strategy becomes a problem. The budget 
decision to build only 120 C-17s is inconsistent with the national security strategy and 
should be changed to support the policy.  If we want to keep our capabilities in line with 
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strategy of the Mobility Requirement Study, its recommendation to increase the C-17 
should be considered to meet the capability requirements. 
3. Developing the Interim Brigade Combat Teams will immediately 
improve the strategic responsiveness of Army ground forces.    
The IBCTs will constitute an important new option for warfighting CINCs as a 
decisive contingency response.  At the operational level, IBCTs will sharply enhance the 
joint force commander’s ability to respond to opportunity and/or uncertainty.  Equally 
important, IBCTs will represent a clear near term improvement in national and theater 
conventional deterrence, providing national command authorities the capability to place a 
credible, visible, and flexible combat force on the ground anywhere in the world within 
96 hours.  Finally, the accelerated development of the initial two BCTs will jump-start 
the Army Transformation Strategy without compromising the Army’s ability to 
accomplish its most fundamental mission. 
To get our troops to the theater more quickly requires faster throughput.  The 
force protection process consists of modes of transportation (air, sea, and surface) 
punctuated with intermodal nodes.  Within the theater, the future airframes must be as 
common as the tactical truck on the battlefield.  The Army must take a hard look at its 
forces and structure to include new aerial platforms to support in-theater distribution, 
medical evacuation, reconnaissance, or personnel.  These vehicles will have to 
complement and replace high mobility, multiuse vehicles currently in the legacy force. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 The following recommendations aim to outline modifications for the air mobility 
force structure to more effectively achieve its mission and the NSS objectives to operate 
in a strategic environment. 
1. Force Structure Development 
Air mobility forces should increase strategic airlift capability by increasing the 
number of C-17s.  To transport the required outsized and oversized cargo, AMC must 
increase its organic airlift capability. Commercial carriers are too small and require 
additional onloading and off-loading equipment to transport outsized and oversized 
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cargo.  The new airlifter, if properly programmed, will achieve the requirements imposed 
by the strategic objectives, while reducing support required. 
2. Airframe Upgrades 
Continuing current upgrade programs will bring mobility air forces up to 
requirements.  These programs enable the older aircraft to conform to aviation 
regulations, meet mission capable levels and operate in today’s strategic environment.  
The up-grade programs address the short-term requirements of maintaining the air 
mobility capabilities to operate in the nations worldwide.  They also lengthen the lifespan 
of the C-5 and KC-135 order to meet both strategic airlift and aerial refueling 
requirements of the air mobility force. 
3. Commercial Carriers 
Reliance on commercial air carriers to supplement the military air mobility force 
structure by transporting passengers and bulk cargo helps reduce the expense of air 
mobility operations.  Commercial air carriers use civilian infrastructure to transport 
passengers and cargo.  Military passenger and cargo airlift requirements exceed the 
capability that DoD can afford to buy.  The Air Force can continue to promote the 
production of a commercial C-17 version, which would add substantially more capability 
to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).  The commercial sector is creating new 
opportunities in the global transportation market by developing a class of aerial transport 
vehicles that can deliver greater tonnage, such as ultra-large aircraft concepts and 
prototypes.  These new heavy lifters would satisfy the commercial need to move goods to 
market more quickly.  Military interface requirements could be incorporated into the 
initial commercial design. 
4. Long Range Airlifters 
The next generation heavy lifters should include the Advanced Tactical Transport 
to replace the C-130 fleet.  The Army should invest in advanced tactical transport with 
the capability for large heavy cargo and very short take-off and landing.  Investing in this 
aircraft allows DoD to retire the legacy C-130 systems within the next 10 to 15 years. 
5. Objective Force Development 
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The Army intends to synchronize the evolution of today's Army to the Objective 
Force, while ensuring the capability to support national security requirements at all times. 
The Army will need to rely on legacy forces, composed of the Army's current warfighting 
organizations, to meet these requirements. At the same time, the Initial Brigade Combat 
Teams will validate an operational and organizational prototype for the Interim Force. 
Conversion to this Interim Force design will expand until science and technology can 
provide the desired long-term systems.      
Implementing the Army's Vision has a significant personnel dimension. The 
Army will need to continue to train and equip its people. The transformation of the 
Institutional Army, along with careful analysis of Army personnel requirements, will 
support the new distribution of personnel and identify any mismatch between 
requirements and congressionally mandated end strength.  
The Army's transformation is conditions-based, which means the pace of the 
transformation is not preordained. At every step, the decision to progress to the next stage 
will depend on the determination that all necessary preconditions have been met. The first 
essential condition that will be met at every step is to sustain the capabilities to meet the 
Nation's security requirements.  
C. SUMMARY 
Air Mobility has changed.  Today’s strategic environment is evolving, based on 
newly identified requirements for capabilities.  To achieve the diverse objectives 
established by the NSS, we must employ mobility forces for a range of operations more 
so now than in the past.  The new air mobility force structure should reflect the new 
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